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Abstract
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) provide an area of expanding research
for cyber defense interests. This research aims to lay the groundwork for a system that can
operate with only knowledge of normal network traffic, using a process known as anomaly
detection. One method for detecting anomalous data is that of Artificial Immune Systems
(AIS). Real-valued negative selection (RNS) is a specific AIS algorithm that can be used
to perform two-class classification when only one class is available for training.
Researchers have shown fundamental problems with the geometry of the most common
detector shape, hyperspheres, in high-dimensional space. Additionally, the research
contained herein shows that the second most common detector type, hypercubes, can
cause problems due to biasing certain features over others in high-dimensional space. To
address these problems, a new detector shape known as the hypersteinmetz solid has been
proposed, the goal of which is to provide a tradeoff between the geometrical problems of
hyperspheres and hypercubes in high-dimensional spaces. In order to investigate the
potential benefits of the hypersteinmetz solid, an effective RNS detector size range is
determined. Then the relationship between content coverage of the dataset and
classification accuracy is investigated. Once these issues are addressed, this research
shows the tradeoffs that take place in high-dimensional data when hypersteinmetzes are
chosen over hyperspheres or hypercubes. The final results of experiments show that
detector shape is the dominant factor in high-dimensional detection, contributing 86% of
variance in the classification accuracy results in 11 dimensions of the chosen dataset as
compared to 0% in 2 dimensions. This verifies that detector shape becomes an
increasingly important factor in classification accuracy within a real-valued negative
selection system as dimensionality increases.
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Detector Design Considerations in High-Dimensional
Artificial Immune Systems
1 Introduction
The United States is currently operating in a networked world. Enemies and allies
alike are increasingly dependent upon cyberspace and, as such, the lines of information
warfare are being drawn. New threats to the U.S.’s information resources are emerging
almost daily. The current research, discussed herein, aims to address these problems by
creating the framework for a network intrusion detection system operating that addresses
the problems presented to artificial immune systems in high-dimensionality by using the
hypersteinmetz solid.
This introductory chapter aims to lay the foundation for the research that proceeds it,
in the following format. First, the vision and policy motivating for the current research are
explored. Next, the problem that this research addresses is proposed. Then, a discussion
of how we attempt to address this problem takes place. Finally, a discussion of the thesis
of this research, and the results obtained follows.
1.1 Motivation
The importance of this research to the United States Air Force (USAF) can be shown
through a discussion of the motivating policies. A few of the pertinent documents include:
the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, United States Air Force
Blueprint for Cyberspace, Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, Cyberspace
Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, and DoD Strategy for Operating in
Cyberspace. The main points of these documents and how they work together to
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implement the information management initiatives previously outlined are discussed in
the following section.
The first major military policy document regarding the operation of DoD forces
within the cyberspace domain was the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace
Operations (NMSCO), published in December 2006. The purpose of the document was to
provide a working framework of how the DoD operates in cyberspace with regard to
military, intelligence, and business operations. The strategy outlines the contexts in which
military operations would be needed to defend the global information grid (GIG).
Although the document focuses largely on the emerging landscape of using cyber as a
weapon, there are also specific focuses on the securing of cyberspace assets. Specifically,
one of the strategic priorities outlined in NMSCO is to
“Maintain continuous active layered defenses using existing information
assurance guidance to protect confidentiality, integrity, availability,
authentication, and non-repudiation of information as it is processed, created,
and manipulated at rest and in-motion [50].”
This policy clearly reflects the move toward fusing the previously discussed IRM
documents within an emerging threat environment.
The United States Air Force Blueprint for Cyberspace (USAFBC), released in
November 2009, was an initial push made by the USAF to integrate the service’s current
cyberspace operations activities with a long-range cyberspace plan. One of the main
purposes of the document was to provide a culture change to the Air Force’s cyber
personnel, specifically to “shift paradigms from network-focus to mission-focus [49].”
The problem of aligning the USAF mission with NMSCO was that there needed to be less
focus on protecting and ensuring the network “for the network’s sake,” and more focus on
ensuring information resources in support of the broader mission. Within the document
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several strategies for accomplishing this task are outlined, with 11 specific objectives
identified [49].
Soon after the USAFBC was released, National Cybersecurity Coordinator Howard
Schulz from the office of President Barack Obama released the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). In a similar vein with USAFBC, the initiative highlighted
12 areas of focus that the federal government would take to help secure its cyberspace
assets. Of the twelve areas identified, two of them pertain to the current discussion:
“Initiative 2. Deploy an intrusion detection system of sensors across the Federal
enterprise” and “Initiative 9. Define and develop enduring ‘leap-ahead’ technology,
strategies, and programs [47].” While there are specific programs outlined in the document
that are beginning to achieve the goal of intrusion detection, Initiative 9 provides the
groundwork for developing new technologies that can help to defend the federal
government’s information resources and the technologies and infrastructure upon which
they rely [47].
Released in July 2010, Cyberspace Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12
was released by the USAF LeMay Center with a goal of codifying the principles laid out
previously in USAFBC. The document’s specific purpose is outlined as
“[T]he Air Force’s foundational doctrine publication for Air Force
operations in, through, and from the cyberspace domain. [It] represents
known sanctioned ideas and practices . . . to provide insight for Airmen to
follow. This document speaks to Air Force support of maintaining
Cybersapce Superiority.” [48]
With the creation of this document, the USAF had, for the first time, created a set of
operational ideas and practices to not only support and defend operations in cyberspace,
but also to execute offensive operations. A principal problem acknowledged within the
document, however, is that it was created prior to a joint operational cyberspace strategy.
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Therefore, when a joint doctrine document would be established, it would be significantly
harder to ensure that they were in alignment [48].
With this void of joint policy in mind, the DoD created the Department of Defense
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (DODSOC) in July 2011. The document created
five strategic initiatives that were aimed at shaping how the military “leverages the
opportunities of cyberspace, while managing inherent uncertainties and reducing
vulnerabilities [51].” The document provides a broad overview of how the DoD is to
operate in cyberspace, and does not provide many details on specific doctrine decisions.
However, it does establish cyberspace as a domain of military operations, decisively
delineating a long-held discussion. It additionally continues to implore organizations to
pursue new defense operating concepts within the context of cyberspace [51].
As the preceding documents have shown, the United States military, and the Air
Force specifically, has-in recent years-taken a keen interest in defining how military
operations are evolving in cyberspace as well as how the federal government’s cyber
assets can be defended. By taking this doctrine, it becomes clear that defense of
information resources relies heavily on the safeguarding of the infrastructure upon which
it resides. Innovation into the realm of network and information infrastructure is essential
to the proper execution of cyberspace operations. The motivational theme of this research,
therefore, is to place the groundwork for a network intrusion detection system in order to
further facilitate protection of United States Air Force technology assets.
1.2 Problem statement
The first question to be answered is “what types of network intrusion detection
systems can be created?” This research investigates anomaly-based network intrusion
detection methods. The specific type of anomaly-based system chosen finds its roots in
the artificial immune systems (AIS) line of research. The specific AIS model chosen is
that of real-valued negative selection. Network intrusion datasets have many features, and
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translate into high-dimensional spaces when translated into real-valued negative selection
problems. However, there are difficulties with real-valued negative selection systems in
high-dimensional data spaces. Two of these problems are: the content covered and biasing
of features by detectors high-dimensional spaces. In order to create a real-valued negative
selection-based NIDS, how do we overcome the content and feature bias problems in
high-dimensional real-valued negative selection detectors?
1.3 How problem statement is addressed
In order to address the problems inherent in high-dimensional real-valued negative
selection detectors, this research focuses on detector shape as the main component of a
successful system design. The hypersteinmetz solid is presented as an alternative to the
most common shapes currently found in the literature: hyperspheres and hypercubes. This
analyzes how the hypersteinmetz performs in high-dimensions, specifically as it pertains
to content coverage and feature bias, when compared against hyperspheres and
hypercubes. The research then shifts toward designing the constraints needed for an
experimental comparison of the three detector shapes. First, the detector radius size is
determined through a set of experiments. Then, the relationship between the content
coverage of a set of detectors, or coverage factor, and real-valued negative selection
classification accuracy is investigated. These experiments are then brought together to
form the basis for an experimental comparison of the effects of detector shape within a
real-valued negative selection system as dimensionality increases.
1.3.1 Thesis statement. This research aims to show that “Detector shape is an
extremely important factor in the effectiveness of a real-valued negative selection system
as the number of dimensions of data increases, especially in comparison to other factors
such as radius size and coverage factor.”
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1.4 Overview of results
The results of the analysis and experiments outlined above confirm the thesis. A
successful detector radius bounding range is found. Then, it is determined that increasing
coverage factor does improve classification accuracy, but at a rate of diminishing returns.
Using these preliminary experiments, it is shown that the classification accuracy of a
real-valued negative selection system is dependent on the shape of the detector chosen
when moving into higher dimensions, and that the hypersteinmetz, specifically, provides
the expected improvements over against the hypersphere detector.
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2 Background
In order to better demonstrate the objective of the current research, a background of
research within applicable fields of study is important. The following chapter aims to lay
the essential framework of knowledge required to sufficiently support the thesis statement
involving detector shapes within a high-dimension artificial immune system.
First, network intrusion detection systems are defined. Then, considerations involving
the selection of a network intrusion dataset are discussed. Finally, an introduction to the
field of artificial immune systems is provided, along with a presentation of research
explaining the problems specific to artificial immune systems in high dimensions.
2.1 Network Intrusion Detection Systems
Before delving into how a network intrusion detection system can aid the information
resource management (IRM) process, an understanding of what network intrusion
detection systems are and how they work is essential. The following sections discuss
intrusion detection systems, distinguish between intrusion detection and intrusion
prevention, explain differences between network and host-based systems, differentiate
anomaly and signature-based methods, and touch on a few of the computational methods
currently used as the backbones of these systems.
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), intrusion
detection is
“The process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or
network and analyzing them for signs of possible incidents, which are
violations or imminent threats of violations of computer security policies,
acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.” [39]
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Therefore, An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a system designed to perform the
process of intrusion detection. Namely, an IDS monitors network or computer system
information to determine if incidents are occurring and then acts upon or alerts someone
to act upon that information. Intrusion detection is simply the process of determining that
an incident has occurred, is occurring, or will occur.
An additional layer often added to the intrusion detection process is that of the
intrusion prevention system (IPS). The purpose of an IPS is to not only act as a detector,
but also as a preventer of intrusion. An IPS can act either after detection of an
intrusion–blocking it from continuing–or before an event has taken place–shoring up the
network or computer system from a potential attack [31]. Going forward, the rest of this
discussion assumes an IDS, rather than an IPS, is the subject.
The next delineation that must be drawn regards network and host-based detection
systems. Network-based IDSs (NIDS) monitor network traffic on a specific segment
within a larger network system; they then classify that traffic, identifying many different
types of events that may interest network management personnel. Contrarily, host-based
IDSs (HIDS) reside on a single host system (e.g. a personal computer, a server, etc.) and
monitor characteristics of the host, and events that occur therein, for suspicious activity. In
addition to monitoring the network traffic for that specific host, an anomaly-based IDS can
also look at system logs, processes, system files, access permissions, and application
permissions in order to detect abnormal behavior [41]. A network-based IDS is the subject
of this research.
The last distinction of different IDS methods is signature-based versus
anomaly-based detection. Signature-based detection “is a technique for intrusion detection
that relies on a predefined set of attack signatures [37].” In this scheme, the IDS attempts
to match current network packets or traffic patterns to predefined attack or anomaly
signatures in a database. The burden therefore is in keeping up with the ever increasing
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number of intrusion signatures [40]. In contrast, anomaly-based detection relies on a
pre-defined baseline of normal network traffic. The system compares incoming network
traffic to the baseline. If the incoming traffic is sufficiently different than the baseline, it is
classified as anomalous. The key benefit to an anomaly-based IDS over against a
signature-based system is that it has the potential to detect new and emerging threats that
have not already been defined in a signature database. However, it can be hard to create a
sufficient baseline of normal traffic, thus causing the system to suffer from a plethora of
false alarms [37]. Despite the drawbacks, though, anomaly-based systems currently
provide the greatest area for research, as signature-based systems such as SNORT cannot
detect newly emerging threats [31].
Within anomaly-based NIDS, there are several methods used to detect anomalous
network traffic. The full extent of these methods is not reviewed and a good discussion of
them can be found in [53]. There are several areas of artificial intelligence research which
attempt to solve the intrusion detection problem with varying degrees of success. One
particular method which has shown initial promise takes the approach of modeling the
human immune system in order to detect anomalous network traffic.
2.2 Dataset Selection
To choose a dataset, an investigation of currently available datasets is in order. This
discussion begins with a look into the problems of data collection, and then delves into an
examination of a number of currently available datasets. There are three types of problems
with using real-world datasets: privacy and anonymization of data, unavailability of data,
and the issue of moving targets [19].
One of the most important topics in any real-world network traffic capture is that of
the legal issues surrounding privacy and anonymization of the data. Ohm et al [36]
demonstrate the tremendous legal concerns surrounding the use and sharing of private
organizations’ network traffic. There are regulations at all levels of government
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surrounding the collection of network data, and–in almost all cases–the anonymization of
addresses is essential. This is important to note, as some of the most essential data
features for network intrusion detection can come from specific internet protocol (IP) and
media access control (MAC) address data. Anonymizing or scrubbing this data can cripple
the operation of a network intrusion detection system.
Legal issues can also create a second problem: unavailable data. Because of the
privacy regulations, not only must data be anonymized, but in most cases it cannot be
released to outside organizations at all. For this reason, a large portion of the novel data
sets used in emerging research are home-grown. Lastly, it is important to realize that the
definition of network traffic is a moving target. Some datasets that are currently used for
benchmarking are more than ten years old and can no longer accurately demonstrate
real-world network traffic [19].
Because of the problems with real-world network traffic, it might seem a logical
conclusion to create synthetic traffic. However, there are additional problems with
creating synthetic datasets, namely background traffic generation and attack traffic
generation. Creating normal traffic requires the use of either a large user-base or a traffic
generation tool. One of the problems with using a tool is that it can be difficult to
represent the distributed nature of real networks. Real networks exist not only in disparate
geographic locations, but also in different network locations. Moreover, truly representing
the cacophony of actual user traffic can be difficult. On the other hand, relying on real
users to create fake network traffic is obviously constrained by the availability of the given
user set for this purpose.
Additionally, creating representative attack data is an extremely difficult problem.
There are an infinite number of potential attack vectors available to malicious actors.
From distributed denial of service attacks to structured query language (SQL) injection
attacks, there is no way to predict and/or guard against all potential attack vectors.
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Therefore, choosing an effective representative subset of these potential vectors is an
extremely difficult task [3].
2.2.1 MIT-DARPA Sets. Two datasets that pertain to this discussion form the basis
for a large portion of the intrusion detection dataset body of knowledge. Both datasets
were created by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Labs in
conjunction with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The first
was created in 1998 and the second in 1999. Consequently, the datasets are commonly
referred to as the MIT-DARPA ’98 and MIT-DARPA ’99 datasets respectively, and both
can be found online at http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/communications/ist/CST/index.html .
As stated in [28], the main goal of creating these datasets was “to drive iterative
performance improvements in participating systems by revealing strengths and
weaknesses and helping researchers focus on eliminating weaknesses.” In order to meet
this goal, the research team created two successive datasets to set a baseline for testing
different intrusion detection systems.
Both datasets were created using similar methodology, with the MIT-DARPA ’99
data collection accounting for some problems that were present in the MIT-DARPA ’98
dataset. The datasets were built to model the standard network traffic of a United States
Air Force (USAF) base, and traffic was simulated in order to account for privacy concerns.
The MIT-DARPA ’98 dataset consists of 32 attack vectors spread out over a seven week
period. The attacks are interspersed with normal network traffic and network packet data
was captured using tcpdump, with approximately 4 Gigabytes (Gb) of data in total
[27, 28, 46]. The MIT-DARPA ’99 dataset consists of 200 instances of 58 attack vectors
launched over a five-week period of time. The packet data was captured using tcpdump
and is divided into a three-week training data subset and a two-week testing data
subset [29, 32].
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A third dataset was created by combining network packet based features of the
MIT-DARPA ’98 dataset with traffic and content based features derived from the original
data [46]. This new dataset was used for the The Third International Knowledge
Discovery and Data (KDD) Mining Tools Competition. It is known as the KDD Cup ’99
dataset and can be found at the University of California at Irvine Machine Learning
Repository: http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html. The
purpose of the competition was to find the best method for intrusion detection by
distinguishing “bad” network traffic from “good.” Specifically, the KDD Cup ’99 data
contains about five million “connection vectors.” Each vector contains 41 features and is
labeled not only as normal or attack, but also with the specific type of attack.
Although the KDD Cup and MIT-DARPA datasets are the most widely used within
the network intrusion detection community, there have been several problems noted with
the data. Three underlying problems with the data generation were proposed in [32]. First,
it was suggested that the data did not truly represent real network traffic, and that the
methods used for modeling real-world traffic patterns were never fully explained.
Secondly, there is no evaluation of the effectiveness of the tcpdump feature used to capture
the packets, as it is known to drop packets during intervals of high traffic. Lastly, and most
importantly, there was never a solid definition put forth for each of the different types of
attack [32, 46]. Additionally, the traffic data for both MIT-DARPA datasets was created
pre-2000. Therefore, the data is over 10 years old. As a result it does not properly convey
modern real-world traffic patterns and makeup.
Further problems were noted specific to the KDD Cup ’99 dataset. Two specific areas
of problem include the presence of redundant records which can bias learning algorithms
and the relative ease of classification that results from the default locations of attacks
within the training and test data [46]. This analysis was used to form a new dataset from
the KDD Cup ’99 data. The NSL-KDD dataset, currently housed at
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http://iscx.ca/NSL-KDD/, aims to remove these issues. It still relies on the same
41-feature vectors of the original KDD Cup ’99 data, but removes redundant records and
recreates the training and test sets in a more challenging order. It is important to note that
the NSL-KDD dataset does not solve any of the dataset creation problems that McHugh
outlined in his analysis of the MIT-DARPA ’98 and ’99 datasets [32]. Mainly due to the
fact that it is the most commonly cited dataset and ease of access, the KDD Cup ’99
dataset is used as the primary network intrusion detection dataset for the purposes of this
research. Further information involving the pre-processing of the dataset for use in the
specific system created is discussed in the following chapter.
2.2.2 High-dimensionality of network intrusion datasets. Network intrusion
datasets tend to have many features. These features represent many different measurable
characteristics of both individual packets and network traffic subsets. For example, while
the KDD Cup ’99 dataset has 41 features, other datasets contain as many as 249 features
[34]. The problem with datasets that contain many dimensions is the “curse of
dimensionality.” First proposed in [4], the curse of dimensionality is tied to the problem of
exponential growth. As dimensions are added, the number of computations needed to
perform basic comparisons while working with the data increases exponentially and
computational power and memory are consumed quickly.
In most cases, the dimensionality problem is addressed by reducing dimensionality
by selecting an ideal subset of features [11]. Due to current computing constraints this is
essential–and will be for the foreseeable future. However, less research has addressed
solutions for how to work more effectively with higher-dimensional data. One benefit of
higher dimensions is specific to anomaly detection. Since anomaly detection systems are
trained on normal data, anomalous patterns are not known. Therefore, it is difficult to
determine which features best separate the anomalous traffic from the normal traffic. Since
the scope of the current research aims to avoid an assumption of prior knowledge of attack
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network traffic, it is important to use as many features as possible. The current research
attempts to address some of the problems inherent with high-dimensional data, especially
as it pertains to both network intrusion detection and artificial immune systems.
2.3 Artificial Immune Systems
The following sections provides a background of artificial immune systems and begin
to explain the challenges in implementing these systems in high-dimensional spaces. First,
a brief overview of artificial immune systems, in general, and real-valued negative
selection, in particular, is performed. Then, the discussion investigates problems presented
by high-dimensional real-valued negative selection systems. Finally, a few competing
approaches to solving the problems presented in high-dimensional real-valued negative
selection systems are presented.
2.3.1 AIS and negative selection. The biological immune system(BIS) is one of
nature’s anomaly detection systems. The basic role of the biological immune system(BIS)
is to recognize all cells within the body and classify them as self or non-self [9]; the cells
used to perform the recognition task are known as antibodies. Many organs, cells, and
processes interact with these antibodies in order to create a robust immune system.
Many BIS processes have been modeled artificially, but the most common is that of
negative selection. Negative selection is a biological process through which antibodies are
“trained.” The process, which takes place in the thymus, begins with a newly-created,
naive, antibody. The naive antibody is presented protein strings that represent self cells
that are commonly found in the host body. If the antibody detectors any of the self strings,
it is “negatively selected” (discarded). This process is repeated continually in order to
create a set of antibodies that does not recognize and thereby destroy healthy self cells.
The negative selection process was first adapted to a computational model by by
Forrest et al [13]. The first phase of the algorithm creates a set of nonself detectors by
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creating detectors and negatively selecting those that detect self point. A large set of these
detectors is created to model the complement of the set of self points within a dataset. In
the next phase, the detector set classifies a set of test points as self and nonself. The
negative selection algorithm was created to operate on sets of binary strings, where each
binary string represented a data point within the dataset.
2.3.2 Real-Valued negative selection. The first attempt to computationally model
the BIS into a real-valued space was that of Perelson and Oster [38]. They presented the
concept of shape-space as an n-dimensional Euclidean vector space. In shape-space, the
Euclidean distance between two points represents the affinity, or similarity, between those
points. Each feature in a dataset can be mapped to a dimension in shape-space.
Shape-space is similar to the concept of feature-space in pattern recognition, but the range
of shape-space is typically limited to the region of feature-space within which values for
each feature can feasibly fall.
By combining the ideas of real-valued shape space along with the negative selection
algorithm, Gonzalez et al [14] created the real-valued negative selection algorithm (RNS).
RNS uses hyper-spheres to define detectors. A random vector is selected to represent the
center of a hypersphere, and a radius is defined to represent an affinity threshold. The
detector generated then defines all points within this hypersphere as non-self. A
randomly-generated detector is compared against all self points. If the detector matches
self, the detector is iteratively moved away from self points toward a location of the most
separation possible from other detectors.
A subsequent approach to randomizing detector generation is to use a method known
as randomized RNS [15]. In this approach, Monte Carlo integration is used to determine
the size of self and non-self within the given feature space, then a number of randomly
placed detectors are chosen according to Monte Carlo integration calculations. Simulated
annealing is then applied to the random detectors in order to space them out as evenly as
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possible over the non-self space. One problem with this method is that it requires a set of
fixed-sized detectors, and this fixed size can cause problems with ensuring that all space is
accurately covered.
In order to solve fixed size detector problem, the V-detector algorithm [22] was
proposed. A V-detector is a variable-sized detector that is used to achieve the largest
possible coverage of non-self space using the smallest number of detectors. In addition to
moving detectors around the non-self space to create a greater spread–as in randomized
RNS–the radii of detectors can be lengthened or shortened to provide a more accurate
coverage. This approach yielded mixed results in practice. It provided for more accurate
non-self/self differentiation, however, two problems arose. First, overlapping detectors can
occur when two detectors’ radii are increased. This overlap causes redundancy in the
detector set and thus wasted computation. Additionally, outliers in the self set can cause
the detectors to shrink and replicate in order to fill a space that would be better represented
by a large detector.
2.3.3 Problem with RNS in high dimensions. Several authors have pointed out the
problem of the curse of dimensionality within real-valued negative selection as it applies
to the growth of shape-space [15, 23, 24]. In order to improve computational efficiency
and feasibility of the ensuing algorithms, several approaches have been used to try to
reduce the size of real-valued shape-space in high-dimensions. The most common
approach is to reduce the number of dimensions through feature selection [11]. Other
approaches include scaling of dimensions in order to reduce unoccupied space [30], and
reducing the complexity of the any ensuing algorithm by reducing the number of self
points present in shape-space [54].
Stibor et al [45] further honed the analysis of how the curse of dimensionality affects
real-valued negative selection a step further by comparing the growth of shape-space to
that of the detectors placed therein. Assuming the length of the radius remains constant, it
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is shown that the content, the n-dimensional extension of the concepts of area in two
dimensions and volume in three dimensions, of a hypersphere approaches zero as the
number of dimensions approaches infinity. Since most algorithms used in real-valued
negative selection use hyperspherical detectors, it is demonstrated through a ROC analysis
that the classification results of traditional RNS-based algorithms suffer due to the
diminishing content of hyperspheres.
2.3.4 Approaches to combat problems with RNS in high dimensions. There have
not been many attempts made to address the problem of hypersphere growth in
comparison to shape-space as dimensionality increases. Stibor et al [44] chose to create a
real-valued positive selection system. In this system, each self point is treated as the center
of a detector of self. Although this approach removes the problem of covering the nonself
portion of shape-space, it fails to address the fundamental problem with hyperspheres.
Rather than eliminating the problem of hyperspherical content approaching zero, it has
just been transferred from nonself space to self space.
The most direct attempt made to combat the hyperspherical growth problem is that of
applying the concept of distance norms to detector shapes [6]. Chmielewski and
Wierzchon first define a real-valued detector as a point centered at a real-valued vector
with an affinity threshold that is not directly tied to Euclidean distance, but rather to a
distance based on either the Minkowski norm distance. The distance between two
n-dimensional points x = [x1, x2, ..., xn] and y = [y1, y2, ..., yn] is determined using the The
Minkowski norm of order m (Lm-norm distance) in shape-space, which is defined in
Equation 2.1.
Lm (x, y) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ n∑
i=1
|xi − yi|m
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
1
m
(2.1)
The Minkowski norm distance is equivalent to Manhattan distance when m = 1 and
Euclidean distance when m = 2. Further, the shape of a detector depends on the value of
m.
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The properties of detector shapes with m ≥ 1 were addressed by Ji and Dasgupta
[24]. However, their analysis of the Minkowski norm distance was done for the purposes
of addressing the speed of their algorithm. Therefore, an analysis of Minkowski norm
detectors with m ≥ 1 was not applied to classification results.
The properties of Minkowski norm detectors with 0 ≤ m < 1 have been discussed by
Aggarwal et al [1] and is applied to real-valued negative selection by Chmielewski and
Wierzchon [6]. It is shown that reducing the value of m directly results in higher
classification accuracy in high-dimensional spaces. However, there is a tradeoff that
occurs between effectiveness and time complexity, as the efficiency of the underlying
algorithms decreases as m decreases.
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3 Approach and Methodology
The following chapter builds upon the framework set in the preceding chapters to
explain the methods used to verify the thesis, “Detector shape is fan extremely important
factor in the effectiveness of a real-valued negative selection system as the number of
dimensions of data increases, especially in comparison to other factors such as radius size
and coverage factor.” The methods described herein build upon the foundational
background overviewed in Chapter 2.
First, the real-valued negative selection algorithm used in this research is presented,
followed by a discussion of the properties of the detector shapes in the real-valued
negative selection system in high-dimensional space. Then, a detector radius sizing
method is discussed. Next, the concept of coverage factor is introduced. Limitations of the
radius sizing methods as the system moves into higher-dimensional spaces are then
explained. Finally, an experiment is laid out to compare the different detector shapes
presented, in order to determine how detector shape influences classification accuracy in
high-dimensional spaces.
3.1 Negative selection system overview
In order to perform the task of network intrusion detection, an artificial immune
systems approach was chosen, specifically a naive real-valued negative selection system.
This real-valued representation of space is known as shape-space, which is a subset of
feature-space where bounds are placed on each feature in order to create an n-dimensional
orthotope [38]. The system is modeled after the real-valued negative selection algorithm
(RNS) [15], where the system randomly creates a set number of hyperspherical detectors
and places them in the regions of shape-space not occupied by self points. Then, any time
that a point is detected by one of the hyperspherical detectors, the point is classified as
nonself.
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Additionally, the created system does not attempt to address the problem of detector
overlap, addressed in [15] and [25]. The current research aims to address specific
problems that arise from implementing an AIS in high dimensional spaces. It is not
necessary to solve the overlap problem in order to address the geometrical problems with
AIS in high-dimensional spaces. The real-valued negative selection algorithm used for all
of the proceeding experiments is shown in Algorithm 1, where p is a data point in the
shape-space, P is a set of data points in the shape-space, Pr is the set of training points, Ps
is the set of test points, η is a pre-determined number of detectors, c represents a point in
shape-space, detc is the detector centered at c, and D is a set of detectors.
3.2 Detector shapes in high-dimensional space
Stemming from the problems of high-dimensional data discussed in Section 2.3.3,
previous research has shown poor results when scaling real-valued negative selection
algorithms to higher-dimensional spaces. It is proposed that, the goals in selecting a
detector shape are threefold. First, it should be computationally easy to determine if a
point lies within the detector. Second, the detector should not be biased toward points in
any given dimension or set of dimensions. Third, the content of the detector, as defined in
Section 2.3.3, should grow proportionally to the content of shape-space as the
dimensionality of the shape-space increases. The following sections define the terms
computational complexity, feature bias, and content ratio as they pertain to detector shape.
3.2.1 Computational complexity. A limiting factor within AISs, and negative
selection in particular, is the number of detectors that can be maintained simultaneously.
Due to limited computing power, a maximum number of detectors is imposed on any
negative selection system. In order to determine the maximum number of detectors
allowed, the computational complexity of each detector must be known. The
computational complexity of a detector shape is defined herein as the number of
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Algorithm 1 Negative selection algorithm
Create training dataset Pr consisting of only self points and testing dataset Ps consisting
of both self and nonself points need to be classified
repeat
Randomly select a center point c within the confines of the shape-space.
while detc detects any points in Pr do
Select a new random value for c
end while
Add detc to the set of detectors D
until η detectors have been created
for each point p in Ps do
for each detector det ∈ D do
Determine if p is detected by det
end for
if p was detected by any det then
Label p as nonself
else
Label p as self
end if
end for
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computations needed in order to determine if a point falls within the given detector. The
number of computations needed is then used to create an upper bound on the growth rate
of the complexity as a function of the number of dimensions, which is reported in
O-notation [8].
3.2.2 Feature bias. Based on the works of Clark and Evans [7] and Perelson and
Oster [38], affinity in shape-space is based on the assumption that points in real-valued
shape-space that lie near each other are more closely related than those that are farther.
For this reason, the distance between two points is relevant for AIS self/nonself
determination. Thus, the shape of a detector can influence whether a point is classified as
self or nonself, and feature bias is therefore defined to account for this dilemma. A
detector is biased toward a certain feature if it has a large Euclidean distance between
points in one feature (i.e. dimension) and a small distance in others. If a detector is biased,
the orientation of the detector or of the points around a fixed detector influence the ability
of a detector to recognize an antigen. Figure 3.1 illustrates this point by showing a case
where the orientation of two points around a square detector, rather than distance between
the points alone, determines whether or not the detector survives negative selection.
Feature bias, b, is defined as the ratio of maximum sensitivity to minimum sensitivity,
where sensitivity, δ, is the distance between the center point of a detector and a given point
on the surface of the detector. Equation 3.1 defines the bias ratio. An ideally biased shape
would have a bias of b = 1, which would mean that it has an equal sensitivity in all
dimensions.
b =
δmax
δmin
(3.1)
3.2.3 Content ratio. Content, C, is the n-dimensional generalization of the
concept of area in two dimensions and volume in three dimensions. As stated earlier,
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the implications of feature bias in a square detector during
negative selection.
shape-space is a subset of feature-space where bounds are placed on each feature in order
to create an n-dimensional orthotope. The content of shape-space, Css, is shown in
Equation 3.2, where pi represents a point in the i-th dimension, βi is the side length of the
i-th dimension, and n is the total number of dimensions in shape-space.
Css = Π
n
i=1 (max(pi) − min(pi)) = Πni=1βi (3.2)
A shape-space element is defined as an orthotopic subset of shape-space with side-length
that is a fraction of the side-length of shape space. Thus, the side-length of a shape-space
element can be represented as β
λ
; where λ, the number of shape-space elements contained
in one dimension of shape-space, is greater than one. The content of a shape-space
element, Cel, is defined in Equation 3.3, where λi is chosen such that
βi
λi
is a constant, thus
creating a shape-space element that is cubic in n dimensions.
Cel = Π
n
i=1
βi
λi
(3.3)
A single detector is sized, in the following equations, relative to a shape-space
element such that the shape-space element is the smallest n-dimensional hypercube that
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completely contains the given detector. Figure 3.2 demonstrates a spherical detector
contained within a shape-space element.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of a spherical detector within a shape-space element in (a) two
dimensions and (b) three dimensions.
The number of shape-space elements contained in n-dimensional shape-space, E(n)
is a function of the number of dimensions, as is shown in Equation 3.4.
E(n) = λn (3.4)
This reveals that the number of shape-space elements required to completely fill the
shape-space grows exponentially with regard to the number of dimensions, completely
independently of the detector shape.
Content ratio, γ is defined as the portion of the content of a shape-space element that
is contained within a single detector, and is shown in Equation 3.5, where Cd is the
content of a detector, and Cel is the content of an element of shape-space.
γ =
Cd
Cel
(3.5)
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Content ratio is an indicator of the number of detectors required to completely cover
shape space when compared to the number of shape-space elements, E(n), required to do
the same. The largest possible content ratio is one, which would require E(n)
non-overlapping detectors to cover shape-space. A content ratio less than one would
require a number of non-overlapping detectors greater than E(n) to cover the entire
shape-space. It is proposed that larger values of γ are preferred, because a higher γ
implies that each individual detector has a higher likelihood of anomaly detection within
the bounding shape-space element.
The use of content ratio allows the ability to asses the number of detectors needed as
dimensionality increases. If a detector’s content ratio decreases as dimensionality
increases, then the number of detectors would need to be increased faster than the growth
of E(n) just to keep the same likelihood of anomaly detection.
3.2.4 A comparison of three detector shapes. Using the concepts of computational
complexity, feature bias, and content ratio, the following section compares the two most
common detector shapes: hyperspheres and hypercubes. Then a third shape, the
hypersteinmetz, is proposed to potentially balance the tradeoffs between hyperspheres and
hypercubes.
An n-dimensional hypersphere is a generalization of the two-dimensional circle and
three-dimensional sphere to n ≥ 4 dimensions. It is therefore defined by equation 3.6,
where [c1, c2, ..., cn] defines the hypersphere’s center point c in n-dimensional space,
[p1, p2, ..., pn] is a point p that is within the hypersphere, and r represents the radius of the
hyper-sphere [52].
r2 = (p1 − c1)2 + (p2 − c2)2 + · · · + (pn − cn)2 (3.6)
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Euclidean distance between points p and c, dpc, for an n-dimensional space is defined
by equation 3.7, where di is the Euclidean distance from point p to c in dimension i.
dpc =
√
d1
2 + d2
2 + · · · + dn2 (3.7)
A point p falls within a given hypersphere detector if its Euclidean distance from the
detector’s center c is ≤ r. This calculation requires three operations for every dimension or
3n = O(n) operations. This is a linear upper bound and is therefore considered
computationally feasible.
Since the surface of a hypersphere is one radius distance from the center point in all
directions, one benefit of using hyperspheres is that they have a feature bias of b = 1; this
is demonstrated in Equation 3.8.
bhs =
δmax
δmin
=
r
r
= 1 (3.8)
Since bhs = 1, we know that the hypersphere is not biased toward any specific dimension
in shape-space.
The primary drawback to using hyperspheres is that as the number of dimensions of
shape-space increases, the content ratio of a hypersphere goes to zero. In [45] it is shown
that for each length of r there exists a dimension n for which the content of the
n-dimensional hypersphere, Chs, is maximized. After this point is reached, Chs goes to
zero as n approaches infinity. This is shown in Equation 3.9.
lim
n→∞ Chs = 0 (3.9)
The content ratio of a hypersphere in comparison to a shape-space element, therefore,
decreases exponentially with respect to the number of dimensions n. The content ratio of a
hypersphere, γhs, is as shown in Equation 3.11 and demonstrated in Figure 3.3. Γ(α) is the
mathematical gamma function, which has factorial growth with respect to α, as shown in
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Equation 3.10 [33].
Γ(α) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if α = 1
(α − 1)Γ(α − 1) if α > 1
(3.10)
γhs =
Chs
Cel
=
π0.5n
n(2n−1)Γ(0.5n)
(3.11)
Figure 3.3: Content and content ratio of a hypersphere with r = 1 as the number of
dimensions increases.
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An n-dimensional hypercube is a generalization of the two-dimensional square and
three-dimensional cube to n ≥ 4 dimensions. For the purpose of this discussion, a
hypercube is assumed to be aligned with the axes of shape space. As such, a hypercube
can be projected onto each dimension as a line segment. A given point y, therefore, falls
within a given hypercube detector if for every dimension it falls within the projected line
segment representing the cube. Each point must be compared to a lower and upper bound
in each dimension. So, the number of comparisons needed is twice the number of
dimensions. This provides a computational complexity bounded by a growth rate of
3n = O(n), making it computationally equivalent to the hypersphere.
The feature bias of a hypercube can be determined by applying the method shown in
Equation 3.1. The shortest distance from a hypercube’s center to the surface, δmin, is equal
to half of the side length, a. The longest distance from a hypercube’s center to the surface,
δmax, is from the center to the corner. The feature bias of a hypercube, bhc, is shown in
Equation 3.12.
bhc =
δmax
δmin
=
√
n
(
a
2
)2
a
2
=
√
n (3.12)
Therefore, as the number of dimensions increases, the hypercubic detector’s feature bias
increases.
Because a hypercube is a specific instance of orthotope where all side lengths ai are
equal, it does not exhibit the decreasing content ratio of a hypersphere as dimensionality
increases. We can see that a is a subset of shape-space such that ahc =
β
λ
. Therefore, there
must exist a shape-space element that contains the hypercube, such that ael =
β
λ
. Based on
Equation 3.3, we can substitute this value and see that a content ratio, γhc, of one is
achieved in Equation 3.13
γhc =
Chc
Cel
=
an(
β
λ
)n = 1 (3.13)
An n-dimensional hypersteinmetz solid is the orthogonal intersection of N cylinders,
where N is equal to the ceiling of half of the number of dimensions, as shown in
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Equation 3.14.
N =
⌈n
2
⌉
(3.14)
−1 0 1
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
x
1
x 3
−1 0 1
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
x
2
x 3
−1 0 1
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
x
1
x 2
−1 0
1
−1
0
1
−1
0
1
x
1
x
2
x 3
Figure 3.4: Hypersteinmetz solid shown from different angles.
An example of a hypersteinmetz is shown in Figure 3.4. For the current discussion, a
unit hypersteinmetz aligned along the shape space dimensions is assumed. The
n-dimensional hypersteinmetz is defined by the set of equations 3.15, where x is a point in
the hypersteinmetz and xi is the i-th dimensional value of x.
x1
2 + x2
2 ≤ r2
x3
2 + x4
2 ≤ r2
...
xn−12 + xn2 ≤ r2
(3.15)
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In order to determine whether a point y resides within a given hypersteinmetz x, each of
the
⌈
n
2
⌉
cylinders is projected down to two dimensions. The point y is projected onto each
dimensional pair. If all projections lie within the corresponding circles, then the point y is
contained by the hypersteinmetz. Since determining if a point lies within a hypersphere
requires 3n operations and a hypersteinmetz can be projected down to a set of
two-dimensional hyperspheres, a hypersteinmetz detection computation requires 3 · 2 = 6
operations for each cylinder. In the worst case scenario, 6N operations would need to be
performed. Therefore, the computational complexity of the hypersteinmetz is
6N = 6 · n2 = 3n, resulting in a worst case growth rate of O(n). The growth rate of
determining if a point lies within a hypersteinmetz is, therefore, computationally
equivalent to determining the same for the hypercube and hypersphere.
The distance between the center point of a hypersteinmetz and the closest point on
the surface is equal to the radius length chosen for all cylinders. Since we are assuming a
unit hypersteinmetz, Equation 3.16 represents the minimum distance.
δmin = r = 1 (3.16)
As Equation 3.17 demonstrates, the values for δmax differ in odd and even dimensions.
δmax =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
√
n
2 if n is even√
n+1
2 if n is odd
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ =
√⌈n
2
⌉
(3.17)
The feature bias of a hypersteinmetz, bst, is shown in Equation 3.18.
bst =
δmax
δmin
=
√⌈
n
2
⌉
1
=
√⌈n
2
⌉
(3.18)
The following equations are presented in order to determine the content ratio of a
hypersteinmetz. First, the content of a hypersteinmetz, Cst, can be found through iterative
integration shown in Equation 3.19, where yi =
√
r2 − xi2.
Cst =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∫ r2
−r2
∫ yn
−yn · · ·
∫ r2
−r2
∫ y2
−y2 dx1dx2 · · · dxn if n is even∫ r2
−r2
∫ yn
−yn
∫ yn+1
−yn+1 · · ·
∫ r2
−r2
∫ y2
−y2 dx1dx2 · · · dxn if n is odd
(3.19)
30
Evaluation of the integrals in Equation 3.19 results in the content expression in
Equation 3.20.
Cst =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
πr2
) n
2 if n is even
16
3 r
nπ
n−3
2 if n is odd
(3.20)
Equation 3.21 shows the content ratio for a hypersteinmetz, γst, obtained by substituting
Equation 3.20 into Equation 3.5.
γst =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(πr2)
n
2
2n if n is even
16
3
rnπ
n−3
2
2n if n is odd
(3.21)
The optimal number of orthogonal cylinders to use in a hypersteinmetz solid detector
is
⌈
n
2
⌉
, where n is the number of dimensions in the shape space. This is due to the fact that
the feature bias does not change as cylinders are added, while at the same time the number
of operations required increases and the content ratio decreases. Therefore,
hypersteinmetz detectors for the purpose of the current research consists of
⌈
n
2
⌉
orthogonally intersecting cylinders.
Comparing the three shapes, the hypersteinmetz balances the problems between the
hypersphere and hypercube. Table 3.1 shows that the hyperspheres content ratio decreases
factorially due to the presence of the gamma function in the denominator, while that of the
hypersteinmetz only decreases exponentially. Additionally, the feature bias of the
hypercube is reduced in the hypersteinmetz by a factor of
√
2. Although the
hypersteinmetz does better in both regards, it does not approach the ideal content ratio of
the hypercube or the ideal feature bias of the hypersphere.
3.3 Detector radius sizing experimental design
The discussion presented in Section 3.2 proposed that content ratio and feature bias
have an adverse effect on detector shape as dimensionality increases. However, we
investigate whether or not content ratio and feature bias translate directly into
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Table 3.1: Table comparing the content ratio and feature bias of the hypersphere,
hypersteinmetz, and hypercube.
Hypersphere Hypersteinmetz Hypercube
Content ratio π
0.5n
n(2n−1)Γ(0.5n)
π0.5n
2n−1 1
Feature bias 1
√⌈
n
2
⌉ √
n
classification accuracy within a real-valued negative selection AIS, and the following
sections describe a set of experiments designed to test this.
The first experiment performed to investigate the relationship between different
detectors is to constrain the range of detector radii that can be used for further
experiments. In order to provide a baseline for the minimum radius size for a detector, it is
important to take into account two things. First, a radius size that is too large does not
allow the detector to fall between data points that are separable. The tradeoff, however, is
that a radius that is too small “overfits” the data by falling between data points that are
similar. Overfitting causes the RNS system to classify points that are self as nonself. The
following sections propose the nearest neighbor method for determining a minimum
detector radius, and a maximum radius sizing method, wherein the largest possible
detector is placed. Once these methods are explained, an experiment is designed to show
that the range produced by the proposed minimum and maximum methods is a feasible
sizing method for the purpose of classification in a real-valued negative selection system.
3.3.1 Minimum radius sizing using nearest neighbor (nn) method. Clark and
Evans [7] noted that the most similarity to any data point is gained by looking at the data
point closest to it. This phenomenon, known as the nearest neighbor principle, is also a
fundamental assumption required in the real-valued negative selection approach to AIS,
expressed by equating the concept of ‘affinity’ with Euclidean distance. Since real-valued
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negative selection fills up negative space with detectors, we need to ensure that groups of
similar points are not broken up by detectors. In order to do this, a nearest neighbor
distance is computed to determine the minimum radius size allowed.
In order to determine how close together similar points are distributed, first a subset
of points P is selected randomly from the set of self training points within the dataset. For
each point p ∈ P, p’s nearest neighbor q is found. The distance, dnn, from p to q is
calculated. Once all values of dnn have been calculated, the mean distance is determined.
This mean nearest neighbor distance then becomes rmin, the minimum radius size. See
Algorithm 2 for further details.
Algorithm 2 Minimum radius sizing using nearest neighbors, where p and q are self data
points, dnn is the minimum distance from p to any q, and rmin is the minimum radius size
for a detector.
repeat
Randomly select a data point p from the training dataset
for each other training data point q do
Determine the distance from p to q
end for
Determine the minimum pq distance, dnn, and record it
until n nearest neighbor distances have been recorded
Set rmin to the mean of all dnn values found
3.3.2 Maximum radius sizing using largest radius placement method. In order to
determine the maximum for the radius range, the largest possible detector is placed. A
detector with radius r =
√
n, where n is the number of dimensions of shape-space, is
placed randomly in shape space. If the detector detects any self training points, its center
point is moved to a new random location. If the detector cannot be placed in fewer than
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10,000 attempts, the radius is reduced by 0.05 · √n and placement is attempted again.
This is repeated until a detector is successfully placed within 10,000 attempts. The radius
length at this point is recorded as the maximum radius size, rmax. Whereas rmin is the same
value regardless of detector shape, each detector shape has a different value for rmax. A
further explanation of the method can be found in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Maximum radius sizing algorithm, where rc is the radius of a given detector
dc centered at point c, n is the number of dimensions of shape-space, a is the number of
center points tested so far, and rmax is the maximum detector radius length.
rc =
√
n
while dc has not been successfully placed do
while a < 10, 000 AND dc has not been successfully placed do
Randomly choose a new center point c
if dc does not detect any self training points then
dc has been successfully placed
set rmax = rc
else
a = a + 1
end if
end while
if dc has not been successfully placed then
rc = rc − .05√n
a = 1
end if
end while
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3.3.3 Detector radius sizing experiment. Current research addresses the need to
search for best radius sizes within a real-valued negative selection system. One solution is
to use the variable sized detectors presented by Ji and Dasgupta [25]. However, when
using fixed-size detectors, the only method shown in the research is that of trial and error
[15]. Additionally, within a variable-sized detector algorithm, all detectors must have an
initial size. Therefore, constraining the range of values in which to search provides the
first steps toward finding the best detector size for a given dataset. The following
experiment is designed to verify that the proposed min and max detector sizing methods
provide a reasonable range of radius lengths within which this search can be performed.
3.3.3.1 Experimental question. Do the nearest neighbor method for sizing the
minimum radius length rmin and the largest detector placement method for sizing the
maximum radius length rmax provide a good lower and upper bound respectively on the
radii to test for the naive real-valued negative selection algorithm described in Algorithm
1?
3.3.3.2 Testable hypothesis. The optimal point, that point closest to the 0%
false positive/100% true positive point via Manhattan distance, on the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve comparing false positives and true positives for a given
classification run falls somewhere between rmin and rmax.
3.3.3.3 Dataset. Datasets are chosen from the University of Memphis
negative selection 2-D synthetic datasets [10]. These datasets have been used by several
researchers in order to baseline and compare effectiveness of real-valued negative
selection algorithms [25][55]. Each dataset involves a training dataset of only self points
and a testing dataset including both self and nonself points. Self points are defined by
some given shape. The datasets used for this specific research include the Pentagram-big,
Pentagram-bigneg, Comb, Combneg, Intersection-thick, Intersection-thickneg, Ring-thick,
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and Ring-thickneg datasets, see Figure 3.5. These specific shapes were chosen as they
provide a good variance of different distributions of data points within shape-space. Each
training dataset includes 1000 2-d self points and each testing set includes 1000 2-d
points, 500 self and 500 nonself.
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Figure 3.5: Datasets used for training, points represent self data.
3.3.3.4 Outline of experiment. For this experiment, the effects of detector
shape is not investigated. Only a two-dimensional hypersphere detector is considered. The
control variables are the percentage of the content of shape-space covered by the detector
set (ignoring detector overlap), size of shape-space, and number of dimensions. The only
independent variable in this experiment is detector size. In order to form a baseline for
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comparison, a successively increasing set of radius sizes are also used. In addition to rmin
and rmax, radius sizes from .01 up to and including rmax, incremented by .01, are tested.
The side-length of shape-space is set at 1 for all dimensions, thus the content of
shape-space is one. The number of detectors created is equal to the number of detectors
needed to create a detector set that holds exactly 200% of the content of shape-space,
ignoring detector overlap. Therefore, the number of detectors, η, is equal to the content of
shape-space divided by the content of a detector, multiplied by the coverage factor f . The
coverage factor is equal to the percentage of content covered, cpct, divided by 100 (see
Equation3.22).
η =
cpct
100
1
2πr2
=
f
2πr2
(3.22)
Additionally, for each radius size threshold, the experiment runs 10 times on each dataset.
Each run of the experiment executes Algorithm 1 recording the numbers of: (I) True
positives - A data point was “NONSELF” and was classified as “NONSELF”, (II) True
negatives - A data point was “SELF” and was classified as an “SELF”, (III) False positives
- A data point was “SELF” and was classified as “NONSELF”, and (IV) False negatives -
A data point was “NONSELF” and was classified as “SELF”. See Algorithm 4 for
pseudo-code representation of this outline and Table 3.2 for tabular specification of
experiment parameters.
3.3.3.5 Representation of results. For each dataset there are 10 runs; the
number of true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives are averaged
over these 10 runs. The mean and variance for each set of runs are recorded. Thus, there
are a mean number and variance of true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false
negatives associated with each radius size of detectors tested. All of these statistics are
collected for each of the datasets and are reported as follows.
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Algorithm 4 Pseudocode of detector radius sizing experiment.
for each dataset do
for r = 0.01→ rmax, by steps of .01 do
Set the number of detectors n such that the total content of all detectors is equal to
200% of the content of the shape-space
repeat
Execute Algorithm 1 and record the true positives, true negatives, false positives,
and false negatives
until 10 tests have been run on each subset
end for
end for
Results are displayed in a series of two-dimensional receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve plots. Each plot represents the results for one dataset (e.g. Comb, Ring
Thick Negative, etc.). The x-axis shows the percentage of false positives–the percentage
of points that were SELF and were classified as NONSELF (i.e. false alarms). The y-axis
shows the percentage of true positives–the percentage of points that were NONSELF and
were classified as NONSELF (i.e. detections). Each point on the plot represents one
radius threshold.
3.4 Coverage factor experimental design
Where the first experiment aims to find a range of radius sizes to use in the
real-valued negative selection system, the next experiment aims to determine how many
detectors to produce once a radius size is chosen. Coverage factor was briefly introduced
in the previous experiment. However, a full explanation is warranted. The content of a set
of detectors CD is the cumulative content of all detectors, disregarding detector overlap.
Equation 3.23 shows Cd as a function of the number of detectors η and the content of an
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Table 3.2: Detector radius sizing experiment design parameters.
Parameter Values
Number of Dimensions n 2
Dataset Comb, Combneg, Intersection-thick, Intersection-thickneg,
Pentagram-big, Pentagram-bigneg, Ring-thick, Ring-thickneg
Detector Radius r 0.01→ rmax, by steps of 0.01,
Shape-Space Content Css 1
Coverage factor f 2
Number of Detectors η f2πr2
10 iterations are performed for each test.
Measured outputs for each test are true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives.
individual detector Cd.
CD = ηCd (3.23)
The content of a set of detectors is also equal to the content of shape space Css multiplied
by the coverage factor f , as shown in Equation 3.24.
CD = f · Css (3.24)
For this reason, a coverage factor of 2 would represent a CD that contains 200% of
the content of shape-space, disregarding detector overlap.
3.4.1 Experimental question. How do we approximate the relationship between
coverage factor and classification accuracy?
3.4.2 Testable hypothesis. Increasing coverage factor does not necessarily
improve accuracy, as the addition of further detectors may cause the system to overfit the
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self data points and also cause increasing detector overlap. However, the difference in
accuracy between runs should decrease as detectors are added. Therefore, as the coverage
factor is increased from 2 to 30, the standard deviation of the classification accuracy
decreases. It reaches a point at which adding further coverage no longer reduces the
standard deviation. Additionally, the mean of the true positives should increase, while the
mean of false positives should decrease up to the point at which adding additional
detectors does not provide additional benefit. Thus, the ROC curves of higher coverage
factors should approach points closer to 0% false positives and 100% true positives.
3.4.3 Dataset. Fisher’s iris dataset [12] is used. The dataset consists of 150 data
points, 50 of each of three classes (Setosa, Virginica, Versicolour). The dataset is broken
into a set of training and testing datasets as follows. Since real-valued negative selection
acts on only two classes (self and nonself) each dataset is set aside one type of iris as
nonself and combine the other two iris types into the self data points. For example, Setosa
and Virginica are combined to create self in order to test classification of Versicolour as
nonself. The larger dataset is broken up in this way to create three separate sets. This
dataset was chosen for two reasons. First, it provides a distribution of data that is not
synthetic, as were the datasets used in radius sizing experiment. Secondly, the dataset has
been used numerous times and results can be compared with those of others.
Additionally, 90/10 cross-validation is used. Each experimental run trains on 90% of
the data and test on 10%. In order to achieve this, the data sets are first each be broken into
ten subsets. Each subset consists of a training subset and a testing subset. The training
subset consists of 90 points (45 from each of the two self classes of iris) and each testing
subset consists of 15 points (5 from each of the two self and one nonself iris classes). The
ten datasets are created such that different points are chosen as test points for each subset.
Therefore, there are 30 total subsets created.
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3.4.4 Outline of experiment. The experiment runs with a four-dimensional
hypersphere detector. The control variables are the size of shape-space, detector shape,
and number of dimensions. The length of shape-space is set at 1 for all dimensions, thus
the content of shape-space is one. Ten successive radii are tested, and for each radius 11
coverage factors are tested. For each set of parameters, the experiment runs 10 times on
each dataset. Each run of the experiment executes Algorithm 1 recording the numbers of
true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives.
The algorithm is executed with η detectors, where η is calculated in the following
manner. The content of a hypersphere in n dimensions is shown in Equation 3.25.
Chs =
2rnπn/2
nΓ (n/2)
(3.25)
The content of a detector set CD is equal to the content of an individual detector Cd
multiplied by the number of detectors in the set η, as shown previously in equation 3.23.
The number of detectors needed in an individual run, is calculated using Equations
3.24, 3.25, and 3.23. This results in Equation 3.26.
η =
f · Css
Cd
=
f · n · Css · Γ (n/2)
2 · rn · πn/2 (3.26)
See Algorithm 5 for pseudo-code representation of this outline and Table 3.3 for tabular
specification of experiment parameters.
3.4.5 Representation of results. Results are represented in two forms. A ROC
curve of false positives versus true positives is created. The tunable statistic used to create
each ROC curve is the size of the radius.
A low variance of classification accuracy between classification runs is desirable.
Low variance means that regardless of the training points selected and the exact placement
of the detectors, the same results are obtained every time. Therefore, the variance of the
classification runs is important to record. In order to capture this, the following procedure
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Algorithm 5 Pseudocode design of coverage factor experiment. r is the radius of the
detector, f is the coverage factor, and η is the number of detectors.
Set the detector shape to hypersphere
Set the number of dimensions to 4
for r = rmin → rmax, by steps of rmax−rmin9 do
for f = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 20, 25, 30 do
for each dataset: Setosa, Versicolor, Virginica do
for each of the 90/10 cross-validation subsets do
repeat
Set η using equation 3.26
Execute Algorithm 1 using η detectors and record the true positives, true
negatives, false positives, and false negatives
until 10 tests have been run on each subset
end for
end for
end for
end for
is completed: The percentage of true positives and false positives are averaged across each
radius/coverage factor pairing; a percentage is computed for each of the ten test runs for
each of the ten test sets for each of the three iris types. The standard deviation across each
radius/coverage factor pairing is recorded. Then, the mean standard deviation across all
radii for a given coverage factor is reported. By comparing the standard deviations of both
true and false positives across different coverage factors, a good coverage factor can be
obtained for future tests.
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Table 3.3: Coverage factor experiment design parameters.
Parameter Values
Dataset Setosa, Versicolor, Virginica
Detector Shape Hypersphere
Number of Dimensions n 4
Detector Radius r rmin → rmax, by steps of rmax−rmin9
Detector Content Cd r
4π2
2Γ(2)
Shape-Space Content Css 1
Coverage Factor f 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 20, 25, 30
Number of Detectors η fCssCd
10 iterations are performed for each test.
Measured outputs for each test are true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives.
3.5 Detector size and coverage factor in higher-dimensional space
Network intrusion datasets are inherently high-dimensional, as explained in Section
2.3.3. As AIS systems are applied in higher dimensional shape-space, there are
considerations in addition to those inherent in different detector shapes that arise. First,
memory constraints of the implementation system constrains the number of detectors that
can be implemented, thus limiting the range of radius sizes that can be used to achieve a
given coverage factor. Secondly, it is shown here that there is a relationship between the
number of dimensions and effective coverage factor within an AIS.
3.5.1 Memory limitations on minimum radius size. Equation 3.26 reports the
method for calculating the number of detectors needed within a run of Algorithm 1 given
coverage factor, number of dimensions, and detector size. However, this number cannot
always be implemented due to memory limitations. In order to use Algorithm 1, all
43
detector/test point pairs must be in memory simultaneously. Therefore, the maximum
number of detectors allowed, is dependent on both the number of test points and the
number of dimensions (i.e. how many comparisons must be made). The constraining
factor in this regard is dependent on the memory of the computing and programming
platforms being used. By taking into account the specific system capabilities, a maximum
number of elements allowed in the arrays arises. Using this maximum, Equation 3.27
shows the exact relation between the maximum number of elements in an array Emax and
the maximum number of detectors allowed ηmax, where n is the number of dimensions and
Ps is the number of test points. The number of test points is important even in a realtime
system, due to the fact that the speed of network traffic determines how many points need
to be calculated at once in order to avoid significant network slowdown.
ηmax =
Emax
n · Ps (3.27)
From the maximum number of detectors allowed, a minimum allowable radius size
follows. Solving Equation 3.26 for r and substituting values from Equation 3.27, Equation
3.28 is derived.
rmin =
n
√
f · n · Γ (n/2)
2 · ηmax · πn/2 =
n
√
f · n2 · Ps · Γ (n/2)
2 · Emax · πn/2 (3.28)
Therefore, the minimum radius allowed due to memory constraints is a function of the
number of dimensions n, coverage factor f , number of simultaneously processed test
points Ps, and the maxim number of elements allowed in an array Emax.
3.5.2 Coverage factor limitations on maximum radius size. In addition to the
problem of limited memory in higher-dimensional space, there is also a maximum
constraint on radius size due to coverage factor in high-dimensions. To define these
high-dimensional coverage effects, here we introduce five terms: potential content, actual
content, redundant content, effective content, and lost content.
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The potential content Cp of a detector set is the total sum of the content of all
detectors in the set. The equation for potential content is shown in Equation 3.23 (it is
repeated here in Equation 3.29). This value is termed ‘potential content’ because it is the
amount of content that could be covered by the entire set of detectors if they were placed
within an infinite shape space with no overlap.
Cp = CD = ηCd (3.29)
Actual content Ca is the total content covered by the detector set (i.e. content covered
by more than one detector is only counted once). This value is termed ‘actual content’
because it does not including overlapping content, but only that content that is actually
applied toward coverage. Contrarily, the redundant content Cr is the content contained in
overlapping detectors. Thus, redundant content is calculated as the difference between the
potential and actual content. The relationship between potential, actual, and redundant
content is shown in Equation 3.30.
Cp = Cr + Ca (3.30)
The effective content Ce is the total content covered by the detector set that lies
within shape-space. Thus, effective content is that part of the actual content that falls
within shape-space. This value is termed ‘effective content’ due to the fact that it is only
the portion of the actual content that has an effect on anomaly detection. Lost content Cl is
that portion of the total content covered by the detector set that is not a part of
shape-space. This value is termed ‘lost content’ because it is that content that is using
computing power, since some portion of each detector must fall within shape-space, but
provides no value toward anomaly detection. The relationship between actual, effective,
and lost content is shown in Equation 3.31.
Ca = Ce + Cl (3.31)
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Whereas the potential content is dependent only on the size of the detector; the
actual, redundant, effective, and lost content are also dependent upon where the detector
has been placed in shape space. In order to maximize the effectiveness of a real-valued
negative selection system, it is important to maximize the effective content, while
reducing the redundant and lost content. By reducing redundant and lost content,
computing power and memory is not used on detectors that are providing no further
benefit to the system. Additionally, maximizing the effective content ensures that the
system is using as much of shape-space as possible to detect anomalies. The relationship
between potential, redundant, effective, and lost content is derived in Equation 3.32, by
substituting Equation 3.31 into Equation 3.30.
Cp = Cr +Ce + Cl (3.32)
The naive real-valued selection system determines the number and size of detectors
based on the principle of potential content, which is introduced here. A coverage factor of
x means that the potential content of the detector set created contains x times the content
of shape space. Since detection is dependent upon effective coverage, not potential
coverage, it is important to ensure that lost content and redundant content are reduced (see
Equation 3.32). Determining the redundant coverage Cr of a set of detectors has been
investigated in the literature and shown to be a computationally difficult problem [42, 43].
Thus, this research considers the problem of reducing lost content. In order to reduce Cl,
this research looks at two cases: the scenario where a detector falls in the extreme corner
of shape space, and that where a detector falls in the center of shape space. These two
locations provide bounds on lost content, since a detector placed at the center has minimal
lost content, and a detector in the corner has maximal lost content.
In the case where a detector falls in the corner of shape-space, there is always content
lost. The percent of content lost depends on the radius length and the number of
dimensions. As the number of dimensions increases, the percent of content lost grows at a
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rate greater than or equal to that shown in Equation 3.33, where the side-length of
shape-space is 1 and n is the number of dimensions.
Cl = Cd − Cd2n (3.33)
Content loss grows at that rate until the radius of a detector exceeds the side-length of
shape space. After this point, it loses content at a greater rate. For example, two
dimensional content loss is shown in Equation 3.34, where l is the side-length of
shape-space, r is the radius length, and n is the number of dimensions. The first half of
Equation 3.34 is found by inserting 2 as the value of n in Equation 3.33. The second half
of equation 3.34 is derived by using the first half coupled with the derivation of the area of
the content of a circular segment as shown in [18]
Cl =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Cd − Cd4 , for 0 ≤ r ≤ l
Cd − Cd4 + r
2
2 ·
(
arcsin
( √
r2−l2
r
)
− sin
( √
r2−l2
r
))
, for l < r ≤ √n
(3.34)
This effect is demonstrated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Figure 3.6 shows the detector content
lost from a two-dimensional hypersphere detector placed in the corner of shape-space as a
function of radius length, while Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of detector content lost
by the same detector. As additional dimensions beyond two are added, the effect of a
radius length exceeding the side-length of shape space becomes more pronounced.
Therefore, a large percentage of content is always lost when a hyperspherical detector is
placed in the corner of shape-space.
However, when a detector is placed in the center of shape-space there is a different
effect seen. The detector has a Cl = 0 until the radius length is greater than half the
side-length of shape-space. After this point, content is lost at increasing rates as radius
length is increased, which is shown in Figure 3.8.
Since content loss is unavoidable, the proper maximum radius size based on content
loss could be an area for further study. Stibor et al also cited observed effects in a study of
47
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Radius
C
on
te
nt
 
 
Lost Content
Effective Content
Potential Content
Figure 3.6: Detector content lost from a two-dimensional hypersphere detector placed in
the corner of shape-space as a function of radius length.
V-detectors stemming from a disjoint between potential and effective content, which may
be attributed to this phenomenon [44]. A maximum radius size of half of the side-length
of shape-space is imposed in order to limit the effects of lost content on the experimental
results of the detector shape comparison.
3.6 Detector shape comparison experimental design
With an understanding of high-dimensional considerations in place, an experiment is
designed to compare the differences between detector shapes in high-dimensional spaces.
First, the goal of the experiment is shown. Next, the pre-processing techniques used on the
chosen dataset–KDD Cup ’99 10% dataset–is explained. Finally, the high-dimensional
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of detector content lost from a two-dimensional hypersphere
detector placed in the corner of shape-space as a function of radius length.
detector sizing considerations explained in Section 3.5 is applied in order to find a
bounding for detector radius sizes. This then leads to an experimental design.
3.6.1 Experimental question. Does the hypersteinmetz solid either provide better
classification results or reduce variance within a real-valued negative selection system as
dimensionality increases when compared to the hypersphere or hypercube?
3.6.2 Testable hypothesis. Holding the number of detectors created for a given
negative selection run constant, the hypersteinmetz solid provides noticeably different
results than the hypersphere, while showing somewhat different results than the hypercube
as dimensionality increases. For the purposes of this experiment, the definition of good
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Figure 3.8: Detector content lost from a hypersphere detector placed in the center of shape-
space as a function of radius length.
relies on the ROC curve for the detection results, comparing false positives to true
positives. For a detector type to provide ”better” results, its classification results, when
reported in ROC curve format, falls closer 0% false positive/100% true positive position
than that of the other detectors; this implies that it can, overall, achieve higher true
positive rates with lower false positives. It is expected that the hypersteinmetz and
hypercube detectors outperforms the hypersphere, by garnering lower mean false positive
percentages and higher mean true positive percentages. This effect becomes more
pronounced as dimensionality increases.
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Additionally, another definition of good for the purpose of this experiment is the
variance that occurs between test runs. If there is a high variance from one run to the next,
the classifications are not repeatable. However, if classification runs are consistently
providing similar results, then they can be relied upon. For this reason, if a shape provides
lower variance–all else remaining equal–than another, it can be considered better in that
regard. It is expected that the hypercube and hypersteinmetz provides classification results
with lower variance than that of the hypersphere.
3.6.3 KDD dataset pre-processing. The KDD Cup ‘99 dataset was chosen for two
reasons. First, it provides an example of a network intrusion dataset with many features.
Secondly, it has been used by many previous researchers, and therefore provides a useful
dataset for comparison purposes. Here, we have used the KDD Cup ’99 10% dataset,
rather than the entirety of the dataset. In the original, there are hundreds of thousands of
data points, and as such an exhaustive investigation of the dataset is not computationally
feasible with accessible resources. Therefore, the 10% dataset provides a subset of the
points that has been used by previous researchers [56]. The dataset is set up in such a way
that all different attack types are fused to form an attack class. This provides for a
two-class classification method, and has been shown previously [5] [35].
In order to use this dataset, however, some pre-processing must first take place. The
KDD Cup ’99 originally contains 41 dimensions of data. However, seven features of the
data are non-real-valued features. The use of the non-real-valued features is an area of
possible future research, but for the current experiment these dimensions are excluded.
Additionally, feature 20 (number of outbound commands) is removed, as every entry in
this field is the same. Thus, the dataset is pared down to 33 dimensions. Similar methods
have been used previously [56].
Three methods were considered for dimensional ordering. The dimension orderings
found in both [26] and [2] were investigated. The method employed in [26] was to rank
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the features from most to least discriminating using information gain, by calculating how
well each feature discriminates a specific class. The method for ranking features proposed
by [2] incorporates the information gain technique along with K-means learning.
Classification results were extremely poor using these two methods. The reason for this is
most likely that both methods were developed in order to determine those features that
would distinguish specific types of attacks, rather than doing a binary–attack versus
normal–classification.
The dimensions were therefore reordered according to the process described in
Algorithm 6, where Psel f and Pnonsel f represent the sets of self and nonself points, p and q
are points within the set of all points, n is the number of dimensions, and ui is the number
of unique nonself points for a given dimension i. The reason the data are arranged in this
manner is that the data are presented to the system in such a way that those features most
likely to show difference between self and nonself points are processed when fewer
dimensions are used. This choice is made, understanding that the objective of the negative
selection algorithm is to train only on self data. However, the objective of this experiment
is not to show the validity of the training process, but rather the effectiveness of the
detector shapes.
From a training perspective, there is no added value in training on duplicate data
points. Previous studies using the KDD data, such as [46], have also recognized duplicate
data as a problem causing the failure of methods using the dataset. In order to eliminate
duplicate points, the dataset is first pared down to only include the features used in the
current iteration. Once this is done, the data is divided into normal and attack traffic sets.
All duplicates are removed from each individual set. However, for testing purposes,
duplicate points may still exist between the normal and attack traffic. This process is
demonstrated in Algorithm 7.
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Algorithm 6 Pseudocode of algorithm to reorder features in KDD dataset
Divide data into self Psel f and nonself Pnonsel f points
for i = 1→ n do
for all points p ∈ Psel f do
Remove all points p with duplicate values in dimension i
end for
for all points q ∈ Pnonsel f do
Remove all points q with duplicate values in dimension i
end for
for all points p ∈ Psel f do
for all points q ∈ Pnonsel f do
if p = q in dimension i then
Remove q from the set of nonself points
end if
end for
end for
Record the number of remaining unique nonself points ui for dimension i
end for
Reorder the dimensions according to ui value, from highest to lowest
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Algorithm 7 Pseudocode of algorithm to remove all duplicate data points
Remove all features not used in this run
Divide data into self Psel f and nonself Pnonsel f points
for all points p ∈ Psel f do
Remove all points p with duplicate values in all dimensions
end for
for all points q ∈ Pnonsel f do
Remove all pointsq with duplicate values in all dimensions
end for
Once the pre-processing is complete, training and testing datasets must be selected
from the data. A random sampling method, similar to that of [56] is used. As the system
must be trained only on self data, only that network traffic considered normal is included
in the training set. 5,000 data points are randomly selected from the entirety of the set of
points classified as normal. Additionally a test dataset is selected; this dataset contains
500 points selected in the same manner. However, these points include not only normal
data, but also data points from the attack traffic (of which there are four types). Attack and
normal traffic points are selected at the same ratio as they exist in the larger dataset, in
order to form the smaller test dataset. The numbers of data points chosen for the
experiment were specifically chosen due to time constraints for completion of the
experiments. More or fewer data points could be chosen in future experiments.
3.6.4 KDD Dataset radius sizing constraints. Detector radius size is a parameter
that must be set in the shape experiment. The methods for minimum and maximum sizing
laid out previously are used to provide a range of testable radii. For every iteration of the
experiment, new rmin and rmax values are determined. Unless memory constraints are the
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constraining factor, the default method for sizing is the nearest neighbor method for
minimum sizing and the largest detector placement method for maximum sizing.
3.6.5 Outline of experiment. This experiment is a full factorial experiment, testing
all three variables: radius size, coverage factor, and detector shape. There are a series of
three different shapes used (hypersphere, hypersteinmetz, and hypercube). For the
purposes of this discussion, the radius of a hypersphere is the distance from the center of
the hypersphere to any point on the surface, the radius of a hypersteinmetz is the
minimum distance from the center of the hypersteinmetz to any point on the surface, and
the term radius is used in conjunction with hypercubes to mean half of the side-length of
the given hypercube. Each detector shape is tested 10 times, using varying coverage
factors, numbers of dimensions, and radius sizes (rmin → rmax, by steps of rmax−rmin2 ). The
results are recorded as true positives, false positives, true negatives, and false negatives.
See Algorithm 8 for pseudo-code representation of this outline and Table 3.4 for a tabular
representation of the variables being tested.
Choosing the dimensional pairs for each of the
⌈
n
2
⌉
cylinders within a hypersteinmetz,
it is important to ensure that each dimension is chosen at least once, ensuring that the
detectors are bounded in each dimension. If computational complexity were not an issue,
it would be logical to choose a random dimensional pairing for each cylinder within each
detector. This would provide an even distribution of possible detector “orientations”
throughout the space. However, in order to keep track of which detectors have which set
of pairings, a matrix of detector dimensional pairings must be kept. This doubles the space
and time complexity needed. For this reason, all detectors are kept at the same pairing. An
area for future research, therefore, is to determine which is the optimal pairing of
dimensions for the
⌈
n
2
⌉
cylinders within a given dataset. Since an optimal pairing of
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Algorithm 8 Pseudocode design of detector shape comparison experiment. r is the radius
of the detector, f is the coverage factor, η is the number of detectors, n is the number of
dimensions.
for each detector shape: Hypersphere, Hypersteinmetz, Hypercube do
for n = 2, 8, 16 do
Determine rmin and rmax using methods described in Section 3.6.4
for r = rmin → rmax, by steps of rmax−rmin2 do
for f = 2, 8, 16 do
repeat
Set η according the number of detectors used for a hypersphere using
equation 3.26, and use the same η for equivalent hypersteinmetz and
hypercube
Execute Algorithm 1 using η detectors and record the true positives, true
negatives, false positives, and false negatives
until 10 tests have been run on each subset
end for
end for
end for
end for
dimensions is not an objective of this research, the pairs are determined by order within
the dataset, with the last dimension being paired with itself.
3.6.6 Representation of results. Results are shown in both graphical and tabular
form. A series of graphs shows a set of ROC curves comparing false positives against true
positives. The series shows the results of runs using different numbers of dimensions,
demonstrating the difference between the detection results of the different shapes as
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Table 3.4: Design parameters for detector shape comparison experiment
Parameter Values
Dataset KDD Cup ’99 10% Dataset
Detector Shape Hypersphere, Hypersteinmetz, Hypercube
Number of Dimensions n 2, 5, 8, 11
Detector Radius r rmin → rmax, by steps of rmax−rmin2
Shape-Space Content Css 1
Coverage Factor f 2, 8, 16
Number of Training Points Pr 5000
Number of Test Points Ps 500
10 iterations are performed for each test.
Measured outputs for each test are true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives.
dimensions are increased. Additionally, a second series of graphs demonstrates how each
individual shape progresses as dimensions are added, with a set of three ROC curves–one
for each shape. Then a set of tables shows the results displayed in the ROC curve, along
with the standard deviations of the results.
3.7 Summary of experiments
All of the experiments contained in this chapter are summarized in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.5: Design parameters for detector shape comparison experiment
Experiment Variables Experimental Question
Detector radius sizing Dataset, Detector ra-
dius r
Do the nearest neighbor method for sizing
the minimum radius length rmin and the
largest detector placement method for
sizing the maximum radius length rmax
provide a good lower and upper bound on
the radii to test for the RNS system?
Coverage factor Dataset, Detector ra-
dius r, Coverage factor
f
How do we approximate the relationship
between coverage factor and classifica-
tion accuracy?
Detector shape compar-
ison
Detector shape, Num-
ber of dimensions n,
Detector radius r, Cov-
erage factor f
Does the hypersteinmetz solid either pro-
vide better classification results or reduce
variance within a RNS system as dimen-
sionality increases when compared to the
hypersphere or hypercube?
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4 Results and Analysis
This chapter present the results of the experiments outlined in Chapter 3. Upon
stating the significant results of each experiment, these results are then analyzed. The
causes of the results are suggested and the significance of each result is discussed.
First, the detector radius sizing experiment results are discussed. Then the results of
the coverage factor experiment are presented. Finally, we present the results of the
detector shape comparison experiment.
4.1 Detector radius sizing experiment results
The detector sizing experiments described in Section 3.3.3 were performed on a Dell
Precision M6500 with an Intel i7 920 processor. This processor has a clock speed of 2.67
Gigahertz (GHz) = 2.67 · 109 cycles/second. The following number of runs were needed:
8 datasets × 20 radius size thresholds per dataset × 10 repetitions per dataset ≈ 1600 runs.
Each run for these thresholds took on average approximately 1.5 minutes. Therefore, the
tests took approximately: 1600 runs × 1.5 minutes/run = 2400 minutes = 30 hours.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the receiver operating characteristic curves of the results of
the experiment. Each data point represents the mean true positive percentage and mean
false positive percentage value attained in ten classification runs with a given radius. The
circled data points represent the results obtained using the rmax value found using the
largest detector placement method for the given dataset. The squared data points represent
the results obtained using the rmin value found using the nearest neighbor method for the
given dataset. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the results shown in the figures, showing the
true and false positive percentages along with the standard deviation of each percentage.
These results are reported only for those runs completed using the rmin, rmax, and best radii.
The results marked ‘n/a’ in Table 4.1 are due to the fact that the minimum radius size was
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not tested, due to the rmin and rmax falling between the 0.01 radius size step of the
experiment. Complete results from this experiment are shown in Appendix A.
For the purposes of this experiment, a false negative percentage and a false positive
percentage is considered to carry equal weight. For example, increasing false negative
percentage by 1% is considered equally as undesirable as increasing the false positive
percentage by 1%. The ideal point on the ROC curve would be at 0% false positives and
100% true positives. For comparison, given this assumption, the Manhattan distance
between the ideal 0%/100% point and a given radius size point provides the level of
‘goodness’ of the radius size point. If point a has a smaller Manhattan distance to the ideal
point than point b, then a’s false positive percentage plus false negative percentage is less
than that of b. The best radius for a given dataset is the one that produces mean
classification results with the smallest Manhattan distance to the ideal point.
Table 4.1: Condensed results of detector size range experiments for the first four datasets
comparing results obtained using rmin, rmax, and best radius sizes. Dist to 0/100 represents
the Manhattan distance of the point to the 0% false positive/100% true positive point.
Dataset Comb Comb Neg Int Thick Int Thick Neg
Point rmin best rmax rmin best rmax rmin best rmax rmin best rmax
Radius .032 .040 .207 .041 .041 .160 .009 .130 .353 N/A .050 .050
Dist to 0/100 22.4 17.6 49.1 20.8 20.8 67.2 17.5 0.2 51.3 N/A 17.1 17.1
True Pos % 99.9 99.6 53.1 99.4 99.4 33.5 100.0 99.8 48.7 N/A 88.2 88.2
TP% Std Dev 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.18 N/A 0.00 0.00
False Pos % 22.4 17.2 2.2 20.2 20.2 0.7 17.5 0.0 0.0 N/A 5.3 5.3
FP% Std Dev 0.87 0.50 0.00 0.70 0.70 0.00 3.54 0.00 0.00 N/A 0.05 0.05
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Figure 4.1: Receiver operating characteristic curves for datasets (a) Comb, (b) Comb
Negative, (c) Intersection Thick, and (d) Intersection Thick Negative
Table 4.2: Condensed results of detector size range experiments for the second four datasets
comparing results obtained using rmin, rmax, and best radius sizes.
Dataset Pent Big Pent Big Neg Ring Thick Ring Thick Neg
Point rmin best rmax rmin best rmax rmin best rmax rmin best rmax
Radius .025 .130 .340 .041 .050 .193 .040 .060 .200 .030 .140 .172
Dist to 0/100 23.5 2.2 57.9 16.5 11.9 50.2 11.7 7.7 51.7 17.6 6.0 10.2
True Pos % 100.0 99.2 42.2 97.4 95.4 50.3 98.5 96.2 48.9 100.0 100.0 95.9
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.15 106.14 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.18
False Pos % 7.2 1.4 0.0 13.9 7.3 0.5 10.2 3.9 0.6 17.6 6.0 6.2
FP% Std Dev 0.55 0.59 0.00 0.80 0.21 1.11 0.99 0.12 0.00 0.49 0.91 0.28
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Figure 4.2: Receiver operating characteristic curves for datasets (a) Pentagram Big, (b)
Pentagram Big Negative, (c) Ring Thick, and (d) Ring Thick Negative
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The trend that emerges from these results is that the best radius size consistently falls
between the minimum and maximum radii. Thus, the rmin and rmax values provide a
reasonable constraint on radius size. The one dataset where the best point does not fall
between the two extremes, Intersection Thick Negative (Figure 4.1d), is because of the
fact that the minimum and maximum values were closer to each other than were the
increments used between radii for the experiment. Therefore, the minimum radius size
was not actually tested. This experiment confirms that the nearest neighbor and largest
detector placement methods are viable constraints for placing a detector radius range in
two-dimensional datasets, given the assumptions of the experiment: two dimensions,
hypersphere detector, and the specified datasets. Therefore, we use this method to bound
detector radius size in future experiments.
4.2 Coverage factor experiment results
The coverage factor experiment described in Section 3.4 was run on a computer with
2 Intel Xeon processors X5472, 3.00 GHz, and 32.0 Gb of random access memory
(RAM). The experiment required the following number of runs: 1 detector shape * 1
dimension size * 10 radius sizes * 11 coverage factors * 30 datasets * 10 runs/dataset =
33,000 runs. An average runtime of 5 seconds created a total runtime of 2,750 minutes (2
days). This was further reduced by running multiple processes, and completion took
approximately 22 hours.
Figure 4.3 contains the ROC curves obtained from the classification results using the
three different types of Iris as nonself. Each line represents all results for one coverage
factor, with the points on the line representing different detector radii. Points are
connected in the order of smallest radius to largest radius, with the smallest usually falling
in the upper-right corner and each consecutive point representing a larger radius until the
final rmax point is reached for the given coverage factor. An individual point represents the
mean classification values for a set of ten runs. Table 4.3 summarizes the results shown in
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figure 4.3 for the best radius for each coverage factor. Complete results are shown in
Appendix B.
The same definition of a best radius is used as that for the previous experiment.
Those points on the ROC curve that provide results with shortest Manhattan distance to
the 0% false positive 100% true positive point are considered to be the best. In that regard,
it can be seen from Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3 that as the coverage factor is increased, the
ROC curves move closer to the 0% false positive 100% true positive point. However, the
aggregate gain in classification accuracy from each successive coverage factor becomes
less. For example, in Figure 4.3a a coverage factor of four provides significantly better
results than a coverage factor of two, but a coverage factor of 15 barely provides better
results than that of coverage factor eight. Specifically, Table 4.3 shows that the best point
produced using coverage factor of two with the Setosa dataset provides a true positive
percentage of 67.2% and a false positive percentage of 5.4%, a coverage factor of four
provides a true positive percentage of 87.6% and a false positive percentage of 4.0%, while
a coverage factor of eight provides only a true positive percentage of 94.2% and a false
positive percentage of 3.2%. Additionally, Table 4.3 shows that each iris type reaches a
point at which the best radius size for the coverage factor is the same for all successive
coverage factors. Setosa reaches this point at a coverage factor of 14, Versicolor reaches it
at f = 12, and Virginica achieves it at f = 8. The reason for this, is that there is that as
coverage factor is increased, the area of nonself space covered by detectors changes less
by the added detectors. As such, the results remain more closely aligned.
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Figure 4.3: Receiver operating characteristic curves as coverage factor increases for
increasing detector sizes for Iris datasets.
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Table 4.3: Condensed results of coverage factor experiments for best radius for each
coverage factor.
Setosa
Cov Factor 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 15 20 25 30
Radius .265 .357 .726 .449 .818 .726 .818 .818 .818 .818 .818
True Pos % 67.2 87.6 89.8 94.2 94.6 97.0 97.2 98.2 98.6 99.0 99.2
False Pos % 5.4 4.0 1.4 3.2 1.4 2.0 1.6 1.3 2.0 2.6 3.1
Versicolor
Cov Factor 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 15 20 25 30
Radius .164 .254 .343 .343 .343 .433 .433 .433 .433 .433 .433
True Pos % 80.2 84.2 85.2 91.2 92.6 93.8 92.0 92.8 94.8 97.4 98.4
False Pos % 15.3 11.0 6.5 8.4 10.2 8.3 9.0 8.9 9.6 13.2 12.3
Virginica
Cov Factor 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 15 20 25 30
Radius .159 .250 .250 .342 .342 .342 .342 .342 .342 .342 .342
True Pos % 73.4 79.4 85.2 84.8 87.6 86.8 90.4 89.8 94.4 95.6 95.0
False Pos % 13.0 10.9 13.7 9.5 10.5 12.8 15.2 16.4 16.5 19.7 21.5
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Another aspect that increasing coverage factor provides is that of reduced variance.
Figure 4.4 reports the mean standard deviation of the percentage of false positive and true
positives over all detector radii for a given coverage factor. Each point represents the mean
percentage obtained by all runs completed with a given coverage factor. Table 4.4 shows
the complete results shown in Figure 4.4 in tabular form.
As can be seen in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.4, as the coverage factor increases, the
standard deviation of the true positive and false positive percentages approaches a
minimum value. This minimum value comes as a result of the fact that by using more
detectors, there is less likelihood of change in the space covered by detectors between two
consecutive runs of the same algorithm. It can also be seen from Table 4.4 that there are
fewer benefits the higher the coverage factor increases.
For example, in the Table 4.4 Setosa section there is a large benefit in moving from a
coverage factor of two up to a coverage factor of 10, with true positive percentage
standard deviation going from 36.5% down to 9.5% and false positive percentage standard
deviation reducing from 18.7% to 8.8%. However, there is little to no benefit once the
coverage factor moves from 10 up to 30, with true positive percentage standard deviation
reducing from 9.5% to 2.3% while the false positive percentage standard deviation
actually increases from 8.8% to 10.0%. The other datasets show a similar effect.
The significance of this finding is that we can use these results to potentially set a
coverage factor range for future experiments. A low coverage factor provides more
variability in the results and a higher coverage factor provides less. It also gives a potential
bound on the highest coverage factor needed to provide a given level of variance.
However, it is important to note that the specific effect of coverage factor is determined by
the dataset in question.
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Figure 4.4: Mean percent standard deviation of the false positives and true positives as the
coverage factor is increased on the iris datasets.
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Table 4.4: Mean percent standard deviations of the true and false positive percentages on
the iris dataset.
Setosa
Cov Factor 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 15 20 25 30
TP% Std Dev 36.5 27.7 18.4 13.9 9.5 7.4 5.5 4.2 3.2 2.8 2.3
FP% Std Dev 18.7 13.9 8.5 8.8 8.8 9.1 9.1 9.4 9.4 9.5 10.0
Versicolor
Cov Factor 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 15 20 25 30
TP% Std Dev 29.8 21.8 19.5 17.9 15.8 14.8 14.2 13.1 11.4 9.6 9.3
FP% Std Dev 18.2 8.6 9.0 9.7 10.1 10.4 10.4 10.6 11.2 11.6 12.3
Virginica
Cov Factor 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 15 20 25 30
TP% Std Dev 22.1 19.3 16.8 16.0 14.7 14.8 14.9 14.6 14.3 12.9 13.5
FP% Std Dev 12.4 10.7 8.4 8.9 8.9 9.8 9.7 9.4 10.3 10.7 10.7
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4.3 Detector shape comparison experiment results
The following section is divided into two sub-sections. First, radius sizing constraints
specifically applied to the KDD Cup ’99 dataset are addressed. Then, the results of the
experiments using these radius sizing constraints are discussed.
4.3.1 Minimum radius sizing. Both the nearest-neighbor and memory limitations
constrain minimum detector size. Using the nearest neighbor method described in section
3.3.1, the minimum radius constraints for the KDD Cup ’99 dataset were found. Figure
4.5 shows the rmin values found using the nearest neighbor method for increasing numbers
of dimensions, it shows that as dimensions are added, the radius of the nearest neighbor
distance increases.
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Figure 4.5: Minimum radius constraint using nearest neighbor (NN) method for KDD Cup
’99 10% Dataset when using 500 test points.
The minimum radius size constraint is calculated using the memory constraint
method described in section 3.5.1. With the limitations of the computer used (AMD
Athlon II X2 215 2.70 GHz Processor, Windows 7 64-Bit operating system, 4.00 Gb
RAM), the maximum usable array contains 250,000,000 elements. These memory
limitations result in a maximum number of detectors. Figure 4.6 shows the maximum
number of detectors allowed with the given constraints as a function of the number of
dimensions. Three numbers of simultaneous test points are compared. The number of
allowable detectors decreases quickly as dimensionality increases. It is significant that the
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number of detectors allowed decreases as dimensions are added, because we have shown
previously that if a detector has a content ratio less than one, the size of a detector is
already decreasing. Therefore, there is not only loss of detection capability due to number
of detectors, but also due to the content ratio of those detectors.
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Figure 4.6: Maximum number of detectors allowed as a function of the number of
dimensions, using a 250,000,000 element array limit.
Figure 4.7 compares constraints on radius size for the memory and nearest-neighbor
methods. Each point in the figure represents the minimum allowable radius for the given
number of dimensions when using one of the two methods, with those using the memory
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constraint method divided among different coverage factors. These results use the same
250,000,000 element limit, with 500 simultaneous test points. Figure 4.7 shows that the
memory constraint quickly dominates the nearest neighbor method for minimum radius
size. In this specific instance, all reported memory constrained minima pass those of the
nearest neigbor method after two dimensions.
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Figure 4.7: Minimum allowable radius size due to memory constraints in comparison to
minimum radius size found using the nearest neighbor method.
Using the nearest neighbor method and the memory constraint method together, the
dominant constraint is chosen. For the two-dimensional case, the nearest neighbor method
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is the dominant constraint. For all other cases, the memory constraint method is the
dominant constraint.
4.3.2 Maximum radius sizing. A similar analysis of the maximum radius sizing
techniques is also undertaken to determine the dominant constraint. The first method
presented in Section 3.3.2, uses the largest detector that can be placed within the dataset to
determine the maximum radius size. Using this method, the maximum detector size limits
shown in Figure 4.8 are obtained. By next imposing the second limit of a maximum
detector radius of half the side-length of shape-space, Figure 4.8 demonstrates how the
constraining factor changes as dimensions are added. Specifically, in Figure 4.8, each
point represents the maximum allowable radius size as a function of the number of
dimensions. The maximum allowable radius size method results are shown for all three
shapes (hypersphere, hypersteinmetz, and hypercube), represented by three different trend
lines. This method is then contrasted with a trend line representing the maximum radius
size determined by the half side-length of shape-space.
Similar to the minimum radius, the maximum radius constraint changes after two
dimensions. Therefore, the maximum radius size for two dimensions is determined by the
maximum detector placement method and the maximum radius for all dimensions greater
than three is set at .5, half the side-length of shape-space. An additional constraint that the
half side-length of shape-space constraint places on the experiment is that no more than 11
dimensions can be used before the minimum values found via memory constraints exceed
the half side-length maximum value. Therefore, the detector shape comparison
experiment was constrained to use between two and eleven dimensions.
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Figure 4.8: Maximum allowable radius size comparing maximum detector placement and
half side-length of shape-space methods.
4.3.3 Experiment results. The detector shape comparison experiment described in
Section 3.6 was run on a computer with 2 Intel Xeon processors X5472, 3.00 GHz, and
32.0 Gb RAM. The following number of runs were performed: 3 detector shapes * 4
numbers of dimensions * 3 radius sizes * 3 coverage factors * 1 dataset * 10 run/dataset =
1080 runs. An average run took approximately 40 seconds to complete, and the total
runtime was approximately 12 hours.
Figure 4.9 shows the receiver operating characteristic curves obtained from the runs
of the detector shape comparison experiment, showing the mean percentage of false
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positives versus the mean percentage of true positives over each set of 10 runs. Each
sub-figure represents a set number of dimensions (2, 5, 8, and 11), and contains a
comparison of the three shapes (hypersphere, hypersteinmetz, and hypercube). Complete
tables of all results are given in Appendix C.
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Figure 4.9: Receiver operating characteristic curves for KDD Dataset comparing different
detector shapes in 2, 5, 8, and 11 dimensions. NOTE: Tthe X axis is scaled from 0% to
1.4%.
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The first point of interest in Figure 4.9 is to compare the shapes as dimensionality
increases. The hypersphere appears to perform progressively worse, by producing fewer
true positives. However, the false positive rate does not increase. The hypersteinmetz and
hypercube perform better as dimensionality increases in terms of true positives, but false
positives also increase.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 further elucidate the values shown in Figures 4.9a and 4.9d
respectively. The classification accuracy results are shown for all three shapes
(hypersphere, hypersteinmetz, and hypercube) for each set of coverage factors and radii in
2 and 11 dimensions respectively. The mean percentages of true positives and false
positives are reported, along with the correlated standard deviations. These tables further
illustrate that the hypersteinmetz and hypercube perform significantly better than the
hypersphere as dimensionality is increased. The reason for this difference in performance
is due to the shape of the detector, and specifically due to the content ratio of the
hypersphere as compared to those of the hypercube and hypersteinmetz.
Specifically, Table 4.5 shows that the results for hyperspheres, hypersteinmetzes, and
hypercubes are very similar in two dimensions, with each shape providing a highest true
positive percentage around 87% and a false positive percentage of 0%. However, in 11
dimensions, shown in Table 4.6, the hypersphere does not provide a true positive
percentage greater than 7.9%, while both the hypersteinmetz and hypercube each provide
a true positive percentage of greater than 90%.
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Table 4.5: Classification accuracy results for three different shapes in 2 dimensions
Hypersphere
Cov Factor 2 8 16
Radius .015 .149 .283 .015 .149 .283 .016 .149 .283
True Pos % 71.1 6.7 0.2 86.0 32.9 1.0 87.5 33.1 1.7
TP% Std Dev 4.42 6.78 0.45 1.44 15.02 1.05 1.13 14.86 1.82
False Pos % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hypersteinmetz
Cov Factor 2 8 16
Radius .015 .149 .283 .015 .149 .283 .016 .149 .283
True Pos % 68.1 8.7 0.2 86.4 20.6 0.9 87.8 28.6 1.4
TP% Std Dev 4.18 13.14 0.26 1.58 16.92 1.03 1.24 15.29 1.21
False Pos % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hypercube
Cov Factor 2 8 16
Radius .015 .149 .283 .015 .149 .283 .016 .149 .283
True Pos % 74.5 4.2 0.0 85.1 21.9 0.6 86.7 36.9 0.6
TP% Std Dev 2.69 6.30 0.00 1.14 9.19 1.00 1.52 6.14 0.44
False Pos % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 4.6: Classification accuracy results for three different shapes in 11 dimensions
Hypersphere
Cov Factor 2 8 16
Radius .379 .440 .500 .430 .465 .500 .458 .479 .500
True Pos % 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 2.5 7.9 2.1 0.5
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.37 0.28 7.74 10.92 6.07 1.38
False Pos % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hypersteinmetz
Cov Factor 2 8 16
Radius .379 .440 .500 .430 .465 .500 .458 .479 .500
True Pos % 59.9 50.2 39.6 81.3 89.0 88.2 93.3 91.1 91.8
TP% Std Dev 22.06 26.23 29.22 16.20 7.76 7.13 2.31 3.95 3.79
False Pos % 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.2
FP% Std Dev 0.36 0.21 0.32 0.48 1.15 1.16 0.55 1.00 1.00
Hypercube
Cov Factor 2 8 16
Radius .379 .440 .500 .430 .465 .500 .458 .479 .500
True Pos % 77.9 84.0 91.4 92.2 92.4 92.2 92.5 92.4 92.4
TP% Std Dev 22.10 16.44 1.29 2.13 2.03 2.46 2.12 2.03 2.03
False Pos % 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
FP% Std Dev 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.17
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Table 4.7 shows the classification accuracy (true and false positive percentage means
and standard deviations) for the best radius/coverage factor pairing for each number of
dimensions for each shape. The best result is, as described previously, considered to be
the one that is the closest in Manhattan distance to the point of 0% false positives and
100% true positives, thus equally weighting true and false positives. Each line reports the
mean value and standard deviation obtained over a set of 10 runs. Table 4.7 demonstrates,
again, the divergence between hyperspheres and the other two shapes. The hypersphere’s
best true positive percentage plummets from 87.5% in 2 dimensions down to 7.9% in 11
dimensions, while the hypersteinmetz increases from 87.8% to 93.3% and the hypercube
from 86.7% up to 92.4%.
However, Table 4.7 also shows that the results for the hypersteinmetz and
hypersphere perform equivalently to each other throughout all the dimensional sets. Given
nine degrees of freedom, based on 10 tests per radius, the true positive percentages for all
three shapes’ best detector overlap 95% confidence intervals of each other in two
dimensions. Additionally, the best hypercube and hypersteinmetz perform equivalently
within a 95% confidence interval of each other for all true positive percentages and all but
one false positive percentage (five dimensions).
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Table 4.7: Classification accuracy for the best radius/coverage factor pairing for each
number of dimensions for each shape
Hypersphere
Num Dims Coverage Factor Radius True Pos % TP% Std Dev TP% .95 CI False Pos % FP% Std Dev FP% .95 CI
2 16 0.016 87.5 1.13 ±0.69 0.0 0.00 ±0.00
5 16 0.125 52.5 16.49 ±10.08 0.1 0.14 ±0.09
8 16 0.299 16.6 11.28 ±6.89 0.0 0.10 ±0.06
11 16 0.458 7.9 10.92 ±6.67 0.0 0.00 ±0.00
Hypersteinmetz
Num Dims Coverage Factor Radius True Pos % TP% Std Dev TP% .95 CI False Pos % FP% Std Dev FP% .95 CI
2 16 0.016 87.8 1.24 ±0.76 0.0 0.00 ±0.00
5 16 0.125 79.1 7.29 ±4.45 2.1 2.03 ±1.24
8 16 0.399 79.3 10.69 ±6.53 0.1 0.12 ±0.07
11 16 0.458 93.3 2.31 ±1.41 0.9 0.55 ±0.34
Hypercube
Num Dims Coverage Factor Radius True Pos % TP% Std Dev TP% .95 CI False Pos % FP% Std Dev FP% .95 CI
2 16 0.016 86.7 1.52 ±0.93 0.0 0.00 ±0.00
5 16 0.125 79.9 8.39 ±5.13 0.1 0.13 ±0.08
8 16 0.299 83.5 6.05 ±3.70 0.2 0.18 ±0.11
11 8 0.465 92.4 2.03 ±1.24 0.2 0.13 ±0.08
Figure 4.10 shows a three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the true positive
percentages of all runs, using the method described in [33]. This is used to determine
which variables in the experiment contribute to the variance of the true positive
classification results. The four plotted values in the figure are the most influential: radius
size, coverage factor, shape, and unaccounted for factors. The actual percentages are
reported in Table 4.8, along with the combined factors that are not shown in Figure 4.10.
It can be seen in the figure and table that as the number of dimensions increases, the
influence of the radius size, coverage factor and error each decrease; while the influence of
the shape increases. The most dramatic decrease from 2 dimensions to 11 dimensions is
the influence of radius size, which decreases from 91.3% in 2 dimensions down to 0.0% in
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11 dimensions. While the largest increase is the influence of detector shape, increasing
from 0.0% up to 85.8%. This is due to the influence of the hypersphere’s content going to
zero as the number of dimensions goes to infinity.
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Figure 4.10: Three-way analysis of variance of true positive percentage, comparing the
influence of a = radius size, b = coverage factor, c = shape, and e = unaccounted for factors
as dimensionality increases
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Table 4.8: Three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of true positive percentage, comparing
the influence of a = radius size, b = coverage factor, c = shape, all combinations thereof,
and e = unaccounted for factors as dimensionality increases
Variance
Dimensions S S a% S S b% S S c% S S ab% S S ac% S S bc% S S abc% S S e%
2 91.3 3.0 0.0 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 3.7
5 27.6 26.4 8.8 1.4 2.1 1.0 1.8 30.8
8 1.2 13.0 64.3 0.3 0.5 3.4 0.7 16.7
11 0.0 3.5 85.8 0.1 0.2 3.4 0.5 6.5
Two notes must be made. First, another factor in the reduction of the influence of
radius size has to do with the reduction in the range of possible radii due to memory
constraints. If more possible sizes were allowable, radius size would probably have a
larger influence. Secondly, there are a few reasons for the variance due to unaccounted for
factors S S e. The choice of training and testing points has some influence on the results
obtained, since they are randomly chosen this could have an effect. Additionally, the
random placement of detectors could hold some sway into the error factor. Lastly, the
ordering of dimensions could have some influence. Specifically, odd numbers of
dimensions allow for biasing of features by the hypersteinmetz solid, since the
hypersteinmetz must use one of the dimensions twice. As such, a future analysis could
look into the best way to order dimensions and choose which dimension to double.
Lastly, one of the reasons that hypersteinmetzes were chosen was because of their
feature bias in comparison to hypercubes. Classification accuracy results for hypercubes
and hypersteinmetzes were very similar (within a 95% confidence interval of each other).
Therefore, the current experiments did not provide enough data to compare feature bias
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between hypersteinmetzes and hypercubes. As such, further experiments could be
designed to specifically compare the feature bias of the different shapes.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
This research has shown that “Detector shape is an extremely important factor in the
effectiveness of a real-valued negative selection system as the number of dimensions of
data increases, especially in comparison to other factors such as radius size and coverage
factor.” Specifically, the hypersteinmetz solid, detector shape proposed herein, provides
benefits of better classification accuracy in high dimensions when compared with the
hypersphere.
This conclusory chapter aims to summarize the research that precedes it, in the
following format. First, a set of conclusions is drawn from the results and analysis found
in Chapter 4. Then, future projects that could extend the current research are proposed.
5.0.4 Detector radius sizing. The detector radius sizing experiment described in
Section 3.3 and with results reported in Section 4.1 showed that the nearest neighbor
method for finding a minimum radius size paired with the largest radius placement
method for finding a maximum radius size provide a good boundary when searching for
the optimal radius size for a real-valued negative selection algorithm. The nearest
neighbor method helps to avoid overfitting by not allowing detectors that are too small,
while the largest radius placement method avoids attempts to use detectors that are too
large for the shape space.
5.0.5 Coverage factor. The coverage factor experiment described in Section 3.4
and with results reported in Section 4.2 showed that coverage factor is directly related to
the classification accuracy results of a real-valued negative selection system. As the
coverage factor is increased, there is a diminishing return on the improvement of the
results. Additionally, increasing coverage factor also reduces variance between
classification runs. These results, paired with the high-dimensional considerations
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described in Section 3.5.2 demonstrate the vital need to understand the effective coverage
provided within a high-dimensional real-valued system.
5.0.6 High-dimensional memory considerations. In addition to the considerations
on coverage factor that high-dimensionality brings, the limitations of memory on the size
of detector radii must be taken into context. Without taking the memory considerations of
the current system setup into account, the effectiveness of the designed system is hurt
significantly due to the necessary loss of coverage due to the number of usable detectors.
5.0.7 Detector shape comparison. Finally, it has been shown that detector shape
not only plays a pivotal role in the coverage of high-dimensional shape-space, but also that
detector shape is directly related the classification accuracy and becomes more important
with increasing dimensionality. This is illustrated in two ways. First, the use of
hyperspheres as detectors in high-dimensional real-valued negative selection systems has
been shown problematic. Table 4.7 demonstrated that the hypersphere’s best true positive
percentage plummets from 87.5% in 2 dimensions down to 7.9% in 11 dimensions, while
the hypersteinmetz increases from 87.8% to 93.3% and the hypercube from 86.7% up to
92.4%. Additionally, it was shown that detector shape becomes increasingly important as
dimensionality increases through an analysis of variance. Table 4.8 showed that the
influence of detector shape increased from 0.0% in 2 dimensions up to 85.8% in 11
dimensions. For these reasons, detector shape choice is a critical decision in the success of
a real-valued negative selection based artificial immune system as dimensionality
increases.
5.0.8 Effectiveness of hypersteinmetz. The hypersteinmetz solid, specifically, has
proven to provide higher classification accuracies in high dimensions than the
hypersphere. This is due to the fact that the content ratio of a hypersphere decreases
factorially as a function of the number of dimensions, while the content ratio of a
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hypersteinmetz decreases exponentially as a function of the number of dimensions. As
such, the hypersteinmetz can be an effective detector shape for use in high dimensional
real-valued negative selection systems.
5.1 Future Work
This thesis has covered only one small portion of the bigger vision for artificial
immune systems and network anomaly detection research outlined in the introduction and
motivation section. In order to work further toward the over-arching visions the following
areas of research could be accomplished: feature bias comparison between hypercubes
and hypersteinmetzes, creating accurate and effective data testing sets, determining the
proper network implementation point of the outlined system, creating a distributed version
of the system that allows for immune memory, and testing the effectiveness of the system
on a scaled network.
5.1.1 Feature bias. The results obtained in this research did not conclusively show
a difference in feature bias between detector shapes. It is likely that further testing of
high-dimensional results could show that feature bias exists in higher quantity in
hypercubes than in hypersteinmetzes. It is possible that this could be shown through
analysis of the standard deviation.
5.1.2 Other network intrusion datasets. Another way that this research could be
furthered is to compare results on more datasets to see if similar results are possible. One
such dataset could be the University of Cambridge dataset referenced in Chapter 2. Tests
on other datasets could then lead to implementation of a realtime network intrusion
detection system onto a simulated network.
5.1.3 Dataset Creation. The data problems outlined previously are systemic
throughout the whole of network intrusion detection research. Testing on datasets that are
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not contrived simulations requires stripping important data out of actual network traffic
data. Conversely, simulating data is difficult, because although it may account for the
overall statistical probabilities of user network traffic, it can never completely reach
real-world data. Still it is essential that new datasets be created and made available to the
cyber operations research community. Whether it be created for overall intrusion detection
or specific attack vector intrusion detection, a labeled dataset is of paramount importance
in creating synergy within the research community.
5.1.4 Distributed Decision Making. One of the major contributions that the
biological immune system can provide is that of immunological memory. In order to take
full advantage of what can be done with this memory, a distributed system is extremely
important. Previous work at the Air Force Institute of Technology [20, 21, 16, 17] has
looked into distributed systems for network intrusion detection. By incorporating these
concepts into an artificial immune system, it could be possible to allow immunities gained
in one location to be conferred upon others.
5.1.5 Testing and Inoculation. Along with the distributed technology a logical
follow-on is the idea of network inoculations, wherein immunity from a certain vector of
attack would be conferred on a system through a benign network attack. In order to
accomplish this, however, it is incumbent that the system be tested on a smaller network
running real traffic patterns. This is not an easy task to accomplish and would require
extensive planning of the testing and experimentation methods and goals before doing any
sort of actual testing. Additionally, it would require a breadth of expertise from network
engineering to computer programming that would likely necessitate an entire team rather
than an individual effort.
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Appendix A: Complete results of detector size range experiments
Table A.1: Results of detector size range experiments for the Comb dataset.
Dataset Comb
Radius 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.120 0.130 0.130 0.137
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 99.9 99.6 90.4 85.0 76.0 66.9 62.9 62.9 62.9 62.9 62.9 62.9 62.9
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.14 0.44 0.17 0.66 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.06
False Pos % 94.0 54.9 22.4 17.2 11.2 7.0 4.6 3.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1
FP% Std Dev 0.76 0.89 0.87 0.50 0.47 0.46 0.21 0.29 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.14 0.14
Radius 0.140 0.144 0.150 0.160 0.170 0.180 0.186 0.190 0.200 0.207
True Pos % 62.8 62.9 62.8 62.9 62.8 62.8 62.8 62.8 62.9 53.1
TP% Std Dev 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.14
False Pos % 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.2
FP% Std Dev 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.23 0.00
Table A.2: Results of detector size range experiments for the Comb Negative dataset.
Dataset Comb Negative
Radius 0.010 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.053 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.120 0.130
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 99.4 89.8 85.3 79.3 72.7 51.1 48.8 46.8 46.2 45.4 45.0
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.70 0.22 0.77 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.13
False Pos % 98.9 79.8 61.0 41.9 20.2 15.2 14.0 10.8 6.4 2.2 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
FP% Std Dev 0.39 0.48 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.25 0.60 0.32 0.58 0.19 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Radius 0.140 0.150 0.160
True Pos % 44.5 44.1 33.5
TP% Std Dev 0.10 0.13 0.16
False Pos % 0.7 0.7 0.7
FP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A.3: Results of detector size range experiments for the Intersection Thick dataset.
Dataset Intersection Thick
Radius 0.010 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.053 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.101 0.110 0.115
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.8
TP% Std Dev 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.09
False Pos % 17.5 7.5 7.0 6.5 5.5 4.5 5.0 3.5 4.0 2.5 1.5 2.0 1.0 0.5 1.0
FP% Std Dev 3.54 2.64 2.58 2.42 3.69 3.69 3.33 3.37 3.16 2.64 2.42 2.58 2.11 1.58 2.11
Radius 0.120 0.130 0.140 0.150 0.150 0.160 0.170 0.171 0.180 0.190 0.200 0.206 0.210 0.213 0.220
True Pos % 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.2 99.1 98.6 98.1 97.7 97.5 97.2 97.3 97.0
TP% Std Dev 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.29 0.23 0.24 0.30
False Pos % 0.5 0.0 1.5 1.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FP% Std Dev 1.58 0.00 2.42 2.42 1.58 2.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Radius 0.230 0.240 0.248 0.250 0.260 0.262 0.270 0.276 0.280 0.290 0.297 0.300 0.304 0.310 0.318
True Pos % 96.6 79.4 78.9 78.6 78.5 78.6 72.0 55.3 53.7 52.4 52.1 51.9 51.6 51.2 50.9
TP% Std Dev 0.29 0.28 0.42 0.38 0.24 0.34 4.31 3.03 0.34 0.27 0.15 0.30 0.23 0.29 0.14
False Pos % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Radius 0.320 0.330 0.332 0.340 0.346 0.350 0.353
True Pos % 50.7 50.2 50.1 49.8 49.3 49.0 48.7
TP% Std Dev 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.18
False Pos % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table A.4: Results of detector size range experiments for the Intersection Thick Negative
dataset.
Dataset Intersection Thick Negative
Radius 0.010 0.011 0.018 0.020 0.030 0.038 0.040 0.050
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.0 96.1 88.2
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
False Pos % 99.6 99.7 96.4 92.6 56.2 27.5 20.3 5.3
FP% Std Dev 0.18 0.10 0.30 0.25 0.49 0.45 0.22 0.05
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Table A.5: Results of detector size range experiments for the Pentagram Big dataset.
Dataset Pentagram Big
Radius 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.116 0.120 0.130 0.140
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.6 99.5 99.4 99.3 99.2 99.2 98.9
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.24
False Pos % 85.0 23.5 7.2 5.1 4.4 4.0 3.2 2.7 2.9 2.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.4 1.6
FP% Std Dev 1.34 1.30 0.55 0.96 0.57 0.74 0.76 0.89 0.71 0.65 0.47 0.67 0.74 0.59 0.47
Radius 0.144 0.150 0.158 0.160 0.170 0.180 0.190 0.200 0.210 0.220 0.230 0.235 0.240 0.250 0.260
True Pos % 98.8 98.7 98.4 98.3 97.8 97.2 96.8 96.6 95.7 94.9 94.1 93.7 92.7 86.2 79.5
TP% Std Dev 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.15 0.33 0.64 0.47 0.57 0.32 0.38 0.63 0.43 0.43 5.87 0.29
False Pos % 1.4 1.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.3
FP% Std Dev 0.38 0.28 0.59 0.28 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.55 0.35 0.50 0.32 0.57 0.35 0.42 0.35
Radius 0.270 0.280 0.290 0.300 0.310 0.320 0.326 0.330 0.340
True Pos % 75.6 52.6 51.3 42.5 42.4 42.3 42.3 42.3 42.2
TP% Std Dev 5.23 0.21 2.95 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06
False Pos % 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FP% Std Dev 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table A.6: Results of detector size range experiments for the Pentagram Big Negative
dataset.
Dataset Pentagram Big Negative
Radius 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.032 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.067 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.120 0.130
True Pos % 100.0 99.8 99.5 99.5 97.4 95.4 92.3 89.5 87.3 84.2 80.8 76.1 70.4 63.6 60.4
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.31 0.43 0.31 0.22 0.43 0.58 0.31 0.42 0.16
False Pos % 98.6 83.7 39.9 35.7 13.9 7.3 5.6 5.3 5.1 4.6 3.8 2.9 1.8 1.4 1.1
FP% Std Dev 0.38 0.55 0.39 0.44 0.80 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.12
Radius 0.140 0.150 0.160 0.170 0.172 0.180 0.190 0.193
True Pos % 58.4 56.7 55.2 54.3 54.2 53.2 51.5 50.3
TP% Std Dev 0.34 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.49 0.10 106.14
False Pos % 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
FP% Std Dev 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.11
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Table A.7: Results of detector size range experiments for the Ring Thick dataset.
Dataset Ring Thick
Radius 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.073 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.120 0.130 0.140
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 99.8 98.5 97.1 96.2 95.1 94.9 94.2 92.8 91.7 90.8 89.7 88.3 86.7
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.24
False Pos % 98.0 82.8 38.1 10.2 4.8 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.6
FP% Std Dev 0.33 0.44 0.73 0.99 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.12
Radius 0.150 0.150 0.157 0.160 0.164 0.170 0.180 0.185 0.190 0.192 0.200
True Pos % 85.3 85.4 83.9 83.8 83.6 52.2 51.5 51.0 50.1 49.7 48.9
TP% Std Dev 0.50 0.43 0.21 0.10 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.22 0.14 0.10 0.10
False Pos % 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
FP% Std Dev 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table A.8: Results of detector size range experiments for the Ring Thick Negative dataset.
Dataset Ring Thick Negative
Radius 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.039 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.081 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.120
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
False Pos % 90.9 40.3 17.6 13.1 12.9 10.9 9.9 9.6 9.1 7.9 7.8 7.7 6.6 7.6 6.7
FP% Std Dev 1.13 0.90 0.49 0.61 0.68 0.97 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.61 0.91 0.62 1.37 0.71 0.68
Radius 0.130 0.140 0.150 0.160 0.165 0.170 0.172
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.8 95.9
TP% Std Dev 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.18
False Pos % 6.5 6.0 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.6 6.2
FP% Std Dev 0.76 0.91 0.73 0.64 0.55 0.66 0.28
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Appendix B: Complete results of coverage factor experiments
Table B.1: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 2, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 2
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 80.4 66.8 67.2 62.2 57.8 48.2 40.2 57.0 81.0
TP% Std Dev 16.56 28.87 30.95 35.16 36.60 40.25 42.51 43.92 49.48
False Pos % 62.3 15.9 5.4 3.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 57.0 81.0
FP% Std Dev 17.11 19.13 10.06 6.39 4.69 1.81 2.75 35.23 49.48
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 86.2 80.2 66.6 60.0 42.6 29.6 13.0 37.0 50.0
TP% Std Dev 16.91 17.60 26.01 26.57 29.63 31.15 26.53 24.07 49.67
False Pos % 53.4 15.3 6.2 4.0 1.8 1.1 0.6 37.0 50.0
FP% Std Dev 16.12 15.42 10.19 6.91 5.64 3.92 3.37 20.73 49.67
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 83.6 73.4 59.2 41.0 18.8 8.6 2.6 6.0 8.0
TP% Std Dev 15.16 22.59 21.72 28.88 27.83 21.92 16.96 19.38 18.05
False Pos % 53.5 13.0 5.0 2.8 1.4 1.4 0.8 6.0 8.0
FP% Std Dev 15.47 16.57 8.45 5.94 4.47 4.56 3.62 18.22 18.05
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Table B.2: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 4, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 4
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 94.2 88.0 86.0 87.6 75.2 74.8 73.4 69.2 85.0
TP% Std Dev 11.93 19.21 20.24 23.08 28.27 33.86 30.32 36.61 37.18
False Pos % 78.9 26.4 10.7 4.0 2.5 1.3 1.0 0.0 85.0
FP% Std Dev 12.25 22.45 12.62 7.94 6.46 4.47 3.02 2.86 30.17
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 98.6 92.4 84.2 74.4 64.0 49.8 33.2 27.0 26.4
TP% Std Dev 5.39 10.58 20.07 20.66 24.73 28.18 29.75 27.02 24.93
False Pos % 65.8 22.7 11.0 4.6 2.9 2.4 1.6 1.3 1.5
FP% Std Dev 15.05 20.20 12.45 8.22 7.04 4.69 5.95 3.92 4.31
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 97.0 90.6 79.4 62.8 36.6 17.6 6.4 2.6 7.0
TP% Std Dev 7.29 14.08 16.84 25.55 28.10 25.97 21.08 14.45 14.96
False Pos % 74.1 24.7 10.9 5.8 3.8 1.9 1.3 1.2 7.0
FP% Std Dev 12.60 20.15 11.37 7.64 6.21 5.77 3.02 3.75 10.93
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Table B.3: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 6, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 6
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 97.6 96.6 95.4 92.8 87.8 83.4 84.0 89.8 80.4
TP% Std Dev 7.24 8.61 8.95 14.59 21.24 23.99 18.70 28.32 20.82
False Pos % 87.1 30.8 13.2 5.7 3.6 2.1 1.8 1.4 0.4
FP% Std Dev 11.96 23.68 14.02 10.33 6.38 4.98 4.75 3.64 3.29
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 99.4 98.0 91.4 85.2 76.8 63.0 42.0 40.2 32.0
TP% Std Dev 2.96 6.03 11.22 17.94 18.38 26.00 30.44 26.76 27.86
False Pos % 74.0 28.8 12.9 6.5 5.6 2.8 3.3 2.4 1.9
FP% Std Dev 13.00 18.92 12.45 9.89 7.07 6.01 5.77 6.70 5.42
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 99.2 95.6 85.2 73.6 47.0 19.8 12.6 4.2 0.8
TP% Std Dev 3.61 9.50 15.04 20.88 28.16 29.23 20.89 20.60 15.30
False Pos % 79.5 27.9 13.7 7.3 4.1 3.3 2.6 1.7 1.3
FP% Std Dev 12.27 19.30 11.61 9.06 6.74 6.08 5.54 5.36 4.12
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Table B.4: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 8, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 8
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 99.4 98.0 97.6 99.2 94.2 89.0 91.4 88.6 87.4
TP% Std Dev 4.69 6.46 7.61 6.16 9.09 17.63 22.03 19.17 22.53
False Pos % 91.4 38.8 14.4 8.9 3.2 2.5 1.9 1.0 1.3
FP% Std Dev 8.62 23.13 17.39 10.22 7.47 6.26 5.04 3.84 2.69
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 99.8 99.4 95.0 91.2 85.0 69.0 55.6 48.4 45.6
TP% Std Dev 2.11 3.61 8.42 12.42 15.63 23.69 27.79 26.72 28.95
False Pos % 78.6 34.7 15.5 8.4 5.6 4.2 3.9 2.4 2.7
FP% Std Dev 11.52 19.89 14.32 10.58 7.85 7.65 6.96 6.21 5.47
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 99.8 98.2 91.0 84.8 59.2 29.6 13.6 5.8 1.4
TP% Std Dev 0.00 5.39 11.05 17.90 27.41 29.54 25.48 22.96 14.93
False Pos % 83.4 33.4 17.8 9.5 6.5 4.1 3.7 2.3 2.3
FP% Std Dev 10.49 19.52 12.65 10.15 7.61 7.47 6.32 5.74 4.13
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Table B.5: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 10, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 10
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 99.2 99.6 98.6 98.8 97.0 91.6 94.6 94.8 94.6
TP% Std Dev 3.61 3.61 5.50 5.02 9.40 14.63 14.21 11.24 13.00
False Pos % 93.5 44.2 16.2 8.9 4.2 4.1 2.0 1.7 1.4
FP% Std Dev 7.10 22.40 17.45 11.02 7.30 5.34 5.19 4.62 3.94
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 99.8 99.6 96.6 92.6 89.0 79.0 65.6 52.2 50.2
TP% Std Dev 2.11 2.96 7.47 9.87 14.11 16.97 23.65 21.94 27.98
False Pos % 81.1 36.0 19.5 10.2 7.4 5.0 5.6 2.3 2.9
FP% Std Dev 11.04 20.69 16.24 11.57 8.89 7.79 7.37 7.07 4.69
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 99.8 98.0 92.6 87.6 65.2 38.4 21.6 3.4 1.0
TP% Std Dev 0.00 6.32 10.30 14.45 23.90 25.31 29.83 23.61 8.61
False Pos % 87.2 34.9 18.4 10.5 8.9 4.4 3.6 2.5 3.1
FP% Std Dev 8.62 21.35 12.83 8.65 8.21 6.78 5.99 5.87 5.36
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Table B.6: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 12, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 12
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 100.0 99.6 99.2 99.2 96.4 93.4 96.2 97.0 96.4
TP% Std Dev 0.00 2.11 3.61 5.84 10.47 11.80 12.45 9.43 8.43
False Pos % 93.7 46.2 20.9 11.4 5.8 3.8 2.5 2.0 1.6
FP% Std Dev 7.24 21.46 18.69 11.80 8.51 6.04 4.78 4.51 4.10
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 95.6 94.0 93.8 79.0 68.4 60.0 50.6
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 8.78 10.23 9.49 17.37 19.71 25.95 28.16
False Pos % 82.6 39.4 20.7 10.8 8.3 5.2 3.6 4.1 3.1
FP% Std Dev 11.40 20.24 15.88 11.88 9.52 9.48 7.07 6.10 6.44
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 99.6 98.4 93.8 86.8 70.4 40.4 20.6 5.0 1.0
TP% Std Dev 2.96 5.02 10.40 14.76 21.94 26.72 25.81 23.27 13.42
False Pos % 87.7 38.2 20.9 12.8 8.3 4.7 4.0 4.3 3.1
FP% Std Dev 9.92 22.34 13.14 11.86 8.80 7.58 6.19 6.54 5.98
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Table B.7: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 14, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 14
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 99.8 100.0 99.2 100.0 97.4 97.2 96.6 97.6 97.2
TP% Std Dev 2.11 0.00 2.96 2.96 6.16 7.24 9.43 6.59 8.91
False Pos % 94.9 48.0 23.9 11.3 7.6 4.4 3.3 2.8 1.6
FP% Std Dev 6.74 21.23 15.74 12.73 8.64 7.03 5.70 5.23 4.75
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 97.4 95.0 92.0 82.6 75.4 63.0 57.0
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 6.32 8.74 10.58 19.04 20.07 26.52 26.39
False Pos % 83.8 40.7 20.6 12.2 9.0 6.6 4.7 3.6 2.6
FP% Std Dev 9.93 19.39 15.65 13.48 9.36 8.24 9.35 7.07 6.00
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 100.0 99.4 96.8 90.4 76.2 44.8 26.0 7.2 1.0
TP% Std Dev 0.00 3.61 7.24 12.16 20.33 30.36 29.52 24.80 16.12
False Pos % 88.5 41.5 23.2 15.2 9.6 7.3 4.8 4.2 3.9
FP% Std Dev 9.37 18.33 14.56 11.10 9.35 7.57 7.69 6.91 6.22
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Table B.8: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 15, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 15
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.6 98.4 97.6 97.4 97.8 98.2
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.11 4.14 7.48 8.43 6.59 7.61
False Pos % 95.1 50.0 24.1 12.6 7.9 4.2 2.8 2.2 1.3
FP% Std Dev 6.23 20.89 17.93 13.29 9.99 6.76 6.16 4.57 4.62
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 100.0 99.8 99.0 95.6 92.8 86.0 76.2 65.0 55.8
TP% Std Dev 0.00 2.11 4.14 7.00 11.95 12.35 19.53 21.11 25.93
False Pos % 82.9 43.1 23.2 12.5 8.9 5.8 6.3 4.8 3.3
FP% Std Dev 9.86 20.25 18.13 12.66 10.22 8.14 7.85 7.00 6.73
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 100.0 99.6 96.8 89.8 76.2 48.2 27.4 10.0 1.8
TP% Std Dev 0.00 2.11 7.29 14.66 17.03 24.99 29.22 26.63 18.29
False Pos % 89.1 40.4 23.8 16.4 9.9 7.8 4.8 3.8 3.9
FP% Std Dev 8.82 20.99 12.85 10.52 8.45 7.58 8.01 5.42 5.67
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Table B.9: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 20, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 20
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.2 97.6 98.0 98.4 98.6
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.96 5.02 7.24 6.03 5.02
False Pos % 97.1 56.3 28.6 16.3 7.4 5.6 3.8 3.2 2.0
FP% Std Dev 5.50 19.97 17.93 12.45 10.65 6.80 6.04 5.75 4.85
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 99.2 97.4 94.8 91.4 80.8 72.4 65.4
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 3.61 6.74 8.42 12.11 16.44 20.65 22.50
False Pos % 85.8 47.6 25.8 14.8 9.6 7.8 7.8 6.3 4.8
FP% Std Dev 9.14 20.36 17.90 13.18 10.83 8.49 7.97 9.21 7.93
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 100.0 99.8 97.8 94.4 84.4 56.0 30.6 13.0 2.4
TP% Std Dev 0.00 2.11 6.32 8.78 16.85 25.82 28.75 27.68 19.02
False Pos % 91.6 46.1 27.1 16.5 12.3 8.0 7.0 5.0 4.3
FP% Std Dev 8.33 19.91 16.91 11.52 9.00 7.18 8.37 7.04 7.23
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Table B.10: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 25, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 25
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.2 98.6 98.8 98.2 99.0
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.61 4.14 4.61 5.39 5.39
False Pos % 97.1 58.6 30.3 17.0 9.0 6.4 5.0 3.5 2.6
FP% Std Dev 4.61 19.43 18.24 13.15 10.24 6.64 6.72 6.39 5.26
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 99.0 98.0 97.4 93.8 89.4 79.6 68.2
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 3.61 6.03 7.00 8.21 12.32 16.12 21.04
False Pos % 87.2 50.0 27.4 18.8 13.2 9.7 7.9 7.2 5.9
FP% Std Dev 8.30 20.18 17.45 12.74 12.20 10.11 9.23 9.46 8.18
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 98.4 95.6 86.4 62.8 33.6 17.0 3.8
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 4.61 8.07 13.49 21.53 26.29 23.65 21.95
False Pos % 92.3 48.9 30.7 19.7 13.8 9.6 7.8 5.9 5.1
FP% Std Dev 7.65 20.85 16.37 12.18 10.69 8.68 8.24 7.73 7.05
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Table B.11: Results of coverage factor experiments using coverage factor 30, true and false
positive percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius, true and
false positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius.
Coverage Factor f = 30
Dataset Setosa
Radius 0.080 0.172 0.265 0.357 0.449 0.541 0.633 0.726 0.818
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.0 98.8 98.6 99.2
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.11 4.14 2.96 5.39 4.61
False Pos % 97.6 60.7 33.8 19.5 11.2 6.5 5.3 4.0 3.1
FP% Std Dev 4.18 18.85 18.17 14.53 11.04 8.10 7.81 6.74 5.32
Dataset Versicolor
Radius 0.075 0.164 0.254 0.343 0.433 0.522 0.612 0.701 0.791
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 99.4 99.0 98.4 95.0 88.0 81.2 75.2
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 2.11 5.02 5.39 7.47 12.65 17.74 20.07
False Pos % 88.3 50.3 30.2 17.6 12.3 11.6 9.6 8.7 7.8
FP% Std Dev 8.10 18.97 18.29 16.11 11.54 10.83 10.44 9.35 9.14
Dataset Virginica
Radius 0.068 0.159 0.250 0.342 0.433 0.525 0.616 0.707 0.799
True Pos % 100.0 100.0 98.2 95.0 85.8 66.0 40.4 15.8 3.6
TP% Std Dev 0.00 0.00 5.39 7.29 14.76 21.18 27.22 27.58 22.40
False Pos % 93.1 50.9 32.3 21.5 16.0 11.9 8.6 6.7 5.6
FP% Std Dev 7.23 21.10 16.06 12.10 9.39 9.37 8.77 7.83 7.71
103
Appendix C: Complete results of detector shape comparison experiments
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Table C.1: Results of detector shape comparison experiments, true and false positive
percentages are the mean percentage calculated over 10 runs per radius size, true and false
positive percentages standard deviations are calculated over 10 runs per radius size.
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